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ABSTRACT 
THE CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE KEMALIST 
PARANOID STYLE IN TURKISH POLITICS 
FIRAT DEMİR 
M.A. Thesis, July 2018
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Sibel Irzık 
Keywords: Kemalism, Paranoia, Political Islam, Psychoanalysis, Culture 
Many years ago, R. Hofstadter pointed out that American political rhetoric was 
suffering from a paranoid style and claimed that such a style was not exclusive to his 
country; for him, it was an international phenomenon. Following Hofstadter, the study 
claims that a style that can be named as paranoid can also be observed in Turkish 
political rhetoric, in the one that has been adopted by Kemalism against political Islam. 
By utilizing the tools provided mainly by psychoanalysis and critical theory, the study 
attempts i) to analyze the style that the founding ideology of the republic has adopted, 
ii) to come up with possible explanations as to why a paranoid discourse has been
developed and sustained to this day and iii) to see what such a style means for the 
nature and tendencies of the ideology itself. To be able to see how deep such a style 
goes, the study surveys not only the foundational texts of the ideology, but also the 
recent literary and cultural works pertaining to Kemalism. By doing so, the study 
attempts to find out what kind of latent and explicit characteristics such a style might 
have and what kind of reaction Kemalism has given against the resurgence of political 
Islam in Turkey. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE SİYASETİNDE KEMALİST PARANOYAK ÜSLUBUN ÇAĞDAŞ 
KÜLTÜREL DIŞAVURUMLARI 
 
 
FIRAT DEMİR 
 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2018 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Sibel Irzık 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kemalizm, Paranoya, Siyasal İslam, Psikanaliz, Kültür 
 
Uzun yıllar önce, R. Hofstadter Amerikan siyasal söyleminin paranoyak bir üsluptan 
muzdarip olduğuna işaret etti ve böyle bir tarzın ülkesine has olmadığını iddia etti; ona 
göre paranoyak söylem uluslararası bir olguydu. Hofstadter'i takiben bu çalışma, Türk 
siyasal söyleminde de paranoyak olarak adlandırılabilecek bir üslubun var olduğunu 
iddia etmektedir; siyasal İslam'a karşı Kemalizm tarafından benimsenen üslupta. Temel 
olarak psikanaliz ve eleştirel kuramın sağladığı araçları kullanarak bu çalışma i) 
cumhuriyetin kurucu ideolojisinin benimsediği üslubu analiz etmeyi, ii) paranoyak bir 
söylemin neden geliştirildiğine ve bu güne dek sürdürüleceğine dair mümkün 
açıklamalar sunmayı ve iii) böyle bir üslubun ideolojinin doğası ve eğilimleri için ne 
anlama geldiğini öğrenmeyi amaçlar. Böyle bir üslubun ne kadar derinleştiğini 
görebilmek için, çalışma sadece ideolojinin temel metinlerini değil, aynı zamanda 
Kemalizme ait edebi ve kültürel eserleri de inceliyor. Böylece, bu tarz bir üslubun ne 
tür gizli ve açık özelliklere sahip olduğunu ve Kemalizmin siyasal İslam'ın Türkiye’de 
yeniden yükselişine karşı nasıl bir tepki verdiğini bulmaya çalışır. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. General Introduction 
 
“Mother, I love you a lot, but I love my country a lot, as well! I am sorry that I cannot 
be by your side on Mother’s Day, but I am protecting our Republic.” read one of the 
placards brought to Republic Demonstrations in İzmir. “We do not want a media 
[coverage] concealing the peril!”  wrote another one from the same demonstration. 
Other slogans went as the following ones: “Is the new generation going to be shaped by 
Imams?”, “[AKP] is reactionary.”1 The aforementioned demonstration took place in 
2007 and the purpose of it was uttered by a politician of the time, Zeki Sezer (then the 
president of  Democratic Left Party, DSP), as being “to get rid of AKP, these dark 
men.”2 If we were to lay together some of the aforementioned words, we could as well 
perceive ourselves to be reading a dark atmospheric gothic novel or a popular detective 
story in which a deep secret plot is carried out against the hero. “I am protecting our 
Republic against these dark reactionary Imams [even though] media [is] concealing the 
peril”. Among all other literary genres of different styles, why did these people and this 
politician feel the need to adopt these particular words creating an overcast atmosphere? 
Why did their particular style was similar to the right wingers’ of the U.S. in that, just 
like the Daniel Bell of the U.S., they felt that once, they were “in possession of their 
                                               
1
“İzmir'in Alanları Yetmedi.” Cumhuriyet Almanya, 18 May. 2007, p. 4. My translation. 
2
 “Son Cumhuriyet Mitingi İzmir'de.” Haber7, 13 May 2007, www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/240710-son-
cumhuriyet-mitingi-izmirde. My translation. 
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country” but sensed their country was on the verge of being “largely taken over from 
them and from their kind” (Hofstadter 4).  
In his article, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics”, Richard Hofstadter attempted 
to understand American “political psychology” through the discourse analysis of 
“[American] political rhetoric” (Hofstadter 77). Upon reading the text myself I could 
not help but notice the analogous identity between the American and Turkish styles of 
political rhetoric thanks to the language used in the aforementioned demonstrations and 
countless other encounters where I have observed an existing lexicon which could be 
submitted as “paranoid”. Thus, I decided that the paranoid style in Turkish politics 
would be engaging to study so as to see how come a paranoid style could become so 
predominant in a discourse and psyche of a particular group and possibly a whole 
society. However, as Hofstadter himself stated over fifty years ago, “[the paranoid 
style] is an international phenomenon” (Hofstadter 86). Therefore, showing the 
paranoid language in Turkish political rhetoric (or in any other political setting for that 
matter)  would only be stating the obvious. Unlike Hofstadter, who mostly wrote in a 
descriptive manner in his study, I wanted to go further and investigate the underlying 
reasons behind such a “paranoid” discursive style if it existed. Therefore, I decided to 
focus on a field where a “paranoid style” could take on subtler and perhaps more 
thought-provoking forms: literature and culture in general, particularly ones that revolve 
around Kemalist ideology.  
Memduh Şevket Esendal, who won the CHP literary prize for best novel with his Ayaşlı 
ile Kiracıları and who is also a prominent figure in the Kemalist literary canon, once 
wrote “this is how politics is; utilizing every chance there is. This nation will do 
whatever it takes to become a sound, vigorous and lively nation. It is necessary to call 
out and shout it into their ears, eyes and their brains [...] with every poem, every song 
and every writing.” (Esendal 244) Following such proclamations, I arrived at the 
opinion that focusing on “paranoid” language in the literary/cultural texts of Kemalist 
writers, for whom it is obvious, as in Esendal’s case, that literature/culture is yet another 
field for implementing a political agenda, would be more productive than the analysis 
of political rhetoric because doing so could give us a hint about the depths of such style 
within the Kemalist body or the Turkish society in general.  
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One might rightfully ask why the study of Kemalist writers is prioritized when Turkish 
politics and most of its agents seem to suffer from a certain level of paranoia regardless 
of their positions in the political spectrum. After all, the actors of the current political 
party in power -which will often be mentioned throughout thesis- has also got a 
substantially paranoid style in political discourse and that style is not less worthy of a 
graduate thesis than this one. Even the whole literature around the single word “upper 
mind (üst akıl)3”, which the former prime minister and current president Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan seems to be very fond of using ambiguously to evade the matters of national 
and international issues alike, can be subjected to a lengthy analysis someplace else. 
However, I believe that if a paranoid language and psyche in Turkish politics can be 
observed, it would be best to return to the founding ideology, -which has been either in 
power or in the major opposition since the foundation of the republic,  and its 
supporters, like those people carrying placards mentioned at the very beginning of this 
thesis-  to seek possible governing dynamics of such a style.  
But why did Kemalists develop a paranoid language and thinking towards political 
Islam in particular
4
, the instances of which we have seen at the beginning of the 
introduction and we are going to see throughout thesis? I believe the traumas Mustafa 
Kemal and the society and/or republic experienced growing up might have affected the 
stance Kemalist ideology adopted towards political Islam. At this point, I see no 
problem likening the development of the ideology to that of a child’s. After all, building 
a metaphor around the political issues has been done before me by a lot of other 
scholars
5
. If we follow the scheme Klein offers, we can come up with an idea why 
Kemalists have developed a paranoid thinking towards Political Islam. Klein contends 
that at a very early age, everyone splits the world into “good” and “bad” as a defense 
mechanism against “envy” and “aggression”, which is present in every person and later 
merges and works through “good” and “bad” in order to develop a strong personality6. I 
                                               
3
 An unknown mastermind or a group which, according to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his supporters, seems to plot 
and control almost every attack towards the Turkish Republic, AKP and/or even himself. 
4
 Of course, political Islam is not the only agent against which Kemalism adopted a paranoid style, such as the West 
or the Kurds but for the sake of the length of this study, the analysis of the discourse has been confined to one 
adopted against political Islam. 
5
 See Freud, Group Psychology; Somay Çok Bilmiş Özne, Kernberg, “Paranoid Social Developments as a 
Consequence of Ideological and Bureaucratic Regression” in Even Paranoids Have Enemies. 
6
 Klein, Melanie.  a e   e   kran. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları. Print. p.35. 
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believe, because of the language and style developed in early Republican Era, Kemalist 
ideology might have drawn its boundaries against political Islam, marking it as “bad”. 
However, it seems they have refused to merge “good” and “bad”, developing not a 
strong political character but a narcissistic thus a paranoid one. Such a theory can 
contribute much to ongoing “hatred/envy/paranoia” of Kemalists towards political 
Islam and persistent paranoid rhetoric on it. Ergo, it would not be surprising to observe 
intensification of such rhetoric at the times of resurgence of political Islam in Turkish 
context, which will be one of the main urges of this thesis to demonstrate. 
At this point it would be best to clarify what is meant by “resurgence” in order to avoid 
any misunderstandings. One could easily and rightfully observe that political Islam has 
always been operative in Turkish politics. However, after 1990s especially the second 
half of the decade and 2000s, as Ahmet Çiğdem has also observed, political Islam has 
been able to generate actors capable of intervening in and/or claiming political 
power/taking over bureaucracy, as we see in AKP’s case (Çiğdem 122). Therefore, it is 
the reaction against such an Islamist movements claiming power -meaning resurging to 
claim power- in the state that this study is interested in analyzing. 
    
1.2. Methodology and Aim 
  
Conducting such study, I will analyze the type of discourse that Kemalist writers use in 
their “artistic” endeavors against political Islam and try to show the resemblance of that 
discourse with paranoia and its symptoms as it is framed by psychoanalysis. Of course, 
as Somay points out in his book which had a similar psychoanalytical stance to 
approaching social and political issues, one feels obliged to defend and explain the 
workings of such a method in social sciences. Just like Somay does, I, too, 
[...] use a psychoanalytical paradigm and a psycho-cultural analytic 
methodology in the overall theoretical structure of my analysis, which 
needs to be justiﬁed from the outset. When I say ‘psychoanalysis’, I mean 
a methodological/epistemological tool of looking at/observing phenomena, 
a theory (theoria, Anschauung),  rather than a ‘science’, a discipline of 
individual psychology or a method of healing. [...]  What I will be trying to 
establish is that psychoanalytical concepts and terminology areas deeply 
rooted in culture, mythology, history, literature, anthropology and even 
archaeology (insofar as these may be treated as narratives) as they are in 
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individual psychology. Employing psychoanalytical concepts in these 
disciplines is not simply a metaphoric endeavour, using psychoanalytical 
‘established facts’ to explain historical and cultural phenomena; it is rather 
the other way around. (Somay Psychopolitics 3-4) 
So, what I intend to do, as Somay explains clearly, is not coming up with scientific 
explanations to paranoid Kemalist style. What I do is rather building up a metaphorical 
scenario and showing the similarities between the individual paranoia explained by 
psychoanalysis and the paranoia that is explicit in political, cultural, sociological 
context regarding Kemalism and Kemalists as a group. That is to say, looking back in 
history and treating books, paintings, video clips, speeches and so on as texts and 
“narratives”,  just like Freud did, I, too, built a “reciprocally metaphoric model, in 
which individual mental traits, disorders and structures would serve as metaphors for 
historical/mythological cultural structures, and vice versa” (Somay Psychopolitics 5) In 
that sense, this thesis may be best situated in a field called psychosocial studies, or 
psychopolitical and even psychocultural one might suggest, which “assert[s] the 
inseparability of the individual psyche from the sociocultural context, trans-referencing 
psychoanalysis and social/cultural/historical analysis as reciprocal preconditions.” 
(Somay Psychopolitics 5-6). To sum up, this study intends to show some structural 
similarities between the paranoid style/ psyche of individuals with those of Kemalists as 
a group and that of Kemalism as an ideology. 
Talking of the concept of “paranoia”, it is necessary to note that I will try to use the 
word in sociological and psychoanalytical senses of the word in my venture to find 
grounds for the employment of the paranoid style in Kemalist literature. I will be 
referring to at least two important concepts, namely “narcissism” in Freudian and 
Kernbergian terms and “projective identification/projection” in Kleinian understanding 
and try to apply them to discourses adopted by Kemalists, whom I believe inherited not 
only a republic but also a kind of lexicon, narcissistic features, traumas and somewhat 
laden “envy” from their political father (Atatürk: the father of the Turks) together with a 
kind of Oedipus complex persistent in Kemalists –if not in all of Turkish society- all of 
which may have contributed to the shaping of a paranoid discourse/language/lexicon, 
which is in general “a language for the construction and negotiation of legitimacy in 
Turkey” (Glyptis 10) and Turkish politics . I will try to show how Mustafa Kemal and 
his early experiences in the stage of history affected his way of thinking and acting and 
how he transferred them to the next generations through his own discourse and mythos 
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surrounding him. For such venture, I will have Nutuk, written by Mustafa Kemal as my 
basis of analysis. I will try to argue that with such a language it chooses, Nutuk, which 
is an important source “for creating a father” figure (Somay Psychopolitics 140), by 
prioritizing and emphasizing on words like “defending”, “enemies”, “traitors” without 
clear signified makes an undeniable contribution to a paranoid thinking among 
Kemalists if not among the Turkish society in general. Also, I will try to demonstrate 
that as narcissistic patients that divide the world into two groups (Kernberg Sınır 205), 
Nutuk and similar foundational texts and discourses adopt a dichotomous rhetoric, 
leading to deepening of paranoid psyche and rhetoric if not creating it all along. 
In order to show what kind of discourse Kemalism adopts after political Islam 
(re)claims its powerful position in Turkish politics, I am going to analyze the language 
used in recent texts produced after around 1990 and make comparisons where possible 
with the foundational texts of early stages of Kemalism to see the probable similarities 
if there are any. Therefore, primarily, I will go into the domain of popular culture and 
try and have a look at the possible reactions in popular culture, the analysis of which 
can tell us a lot about the liabilities of Kemalists and Turkish society in general. In this 
section, I will have a look at some of the texts of personalities like Levent Kırca and 
Nihat Genç. Then, I will steer my attention to the works of people who are considered 
to have produced more decent works of art in terms of their aesthetic values and try to 
do my best to demonstrate how paranoia has affected their works. I will have a look at 
the works of Ataol Behramoğlu, who can be claimed to have his own canon in 
Turkish/Kemalist literature and a painting of Bedri Baykam, who is a renowned Turkish 
painter. 
When I will concentrate on its implications in politics, I intend to use the concept of 
paranoia in a negative sense, just like Hofstadter himself does in his article. If paranoia 
is persistent in the Kemalist psyche, as I claim, it might be one of the most important 
reasons behind the confirming idea of “bureaucracy” and authoritarian tendencies 
among Kemalists and in Kemalist ideology. Also, if paranoia is still persistent in their 
ideology so many years after it was put forward, I argue that it is against one of the 
most -if not the most- important one among the six founding principles of Kemalist 
ideology: revolutionism. Let alone being a revolutionist, I will argue that as an ideology 
which maintains its paranoid discourse and which is “fixated” in its primitive stages, 
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Kemalism shows serious reactionary tendencies in Turkish political context when it 
comes to its reaction towards political Islam.  
 
1.3. Outline 
 
This thesis is comprised of five chapters in total. After the introductory first chapter, I 
am going to give a historical background of Kemalism and its discourse against political 
Islam. While doing so, I will try to find theoretical grounds for the adoption of such 
discursive style from the fields of politics, sociology and psychoanalysis. Having done 
so, I will reserve a chapter for the books produced for the general liking of the general 
society, which in this respect, can be categorized as popular. In this chapter, I will try 
and argue if Kemalist ideology and discourse -the paranoid one in particular- has had 
any impact on the cultural domain as well as the political one. In Chapter 4, I am going 
to have a look at the writings of two Kemalists
7
, Ataol Behramoğlu, who is named as 
the “grand poet” by Özdil, -one of the top ideologues of Kemalist ideology today8- and 
a painting by Bedri Baykam, and try to show how their style might reflect the paranoid 
style against political Islam that is prevalent in Kemalist ideology. Of course, in the 
final chapter, I am going to summarize my findings and try to reflect on their 
implications for aesthetics, politics and socio-psychology in terms of Turkish context 
and Kemalism in particular.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7
  By Kemalist writers, I mean the writers who either call themselves “Kemalists” or who show Kemalist tendencies 
in their discourses. 
8
 Özdil, Yılmaz. Adam. İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınları, 2016. p. 82 
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CHAPTER 2 
KEMALISM, POLITICAL ISLAM AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS TO 
PREVALENT PARANOID STYLE 
2.1. Kemalism 
 
What is Kemalism that has been the main subject of discussion of innumerable if not all 
of the political discussions made in Turkish politics and sociology? “It is a political 
ideology” (Parla Kemalist 19) which “Atatürk has contributed to forming with his ideas 
at first hand” (Parla Kemalist 300) that “has continued to prevail for 70 years 
official[ly]/half official[ly]” (Parla Kemalist 300). As far as this thesis concerned, we 
can briefly define Kemalism as the ideology, the outline of which has been drawn in 
CHP (Republican People’s Party) party programmes starting from the one prepared in 
1931. According to that programme and the one prepared in 1935, CHP is a 
“republican, nationalist, statist, populist, laicistic, and revolutionist” party “principles of 
which is called Kemalism”9 (C.H.P Programı 2, 6).  
Just like other political ideologies, Kemalism may have shown minor ramifications in 
terms of its definitions, interpretations and practices in time due to changing ideologues, 
party leaders and practitioners. However, the core principles holding the ideology 
together identified in the 1930s or even before have remained almost untouched. It will 
not be the aim of this thesis to show if Kemalism has been able to become the ideology 
                                               
9
 It is important to note that the name Kemalism is introduced in the programme that was prepared in 1935 even 
though the principles were already established in 1931’s party programme. 
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it claimed to be or provide a brand new interpretation or reading of the ideology itself. 
Instead, I will accept an interpretation, which I think is a fair one and try to show why 
that interpretation has validity while shedding light on and deconstructing the paranoid 
style Kemalists possess. According to Taha Parla, who has been studying Kemalism for 
decades: 
Kemalism-Ataturkism-the Six Arrows of CHP is an ideological whole. 
Neither historically nor logically or semantically can they be separated 
from each other. [...] [Kemalism] claims to be the sole truth, to be similar 
only to itself, to find others vile and harmful and to be valid forever and so 
on. [...] This strict political ideology is pro-leader, paternalist, elitist and 
tutelary. It is not pluralist, tolerant or agreeable. [...] It is authoritarian, and 
totalitarian at times. It is para-militarist, and occasionally direct militarist. 
In short: it is anti-democratic. (Parla Kemalist 302-303) 
In Taha Parla’s formulation of Kemalism, the most crucial word within the context of 
this thesis is “paternalist” since it will be argued that the fatherly figure of Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk’s and speeches together with the actions of his might have greatly 
influenced the type of discursive style Kemalists adopted within the last several 
decades, just like a father forming/influencing his children’s identity.  
 
2.1.2. Kemalism, Political Islam and Laïcité 
 
When Kemalism was being formed in the early 1920s
10
, Islam and Islam-related words 
already occupied a big place in the Kemalist lexicon. After all, it was being formed in 
Ottoman Empire and Ottoman Empire, with its Sultan also being the head of all the 
Muslims in the world (Caliph), had a tremendous Islamic mark in its political tradition 
even if we exclude the major role of Islam in social context and culture. Therefore, a 
political ideology, albeit old or new, had to consider Islam and had to have a say about 
it. During the Independence War period, Mustafa Kemal did not target political Islam in 
his discourse. He even: “[...] articulated his faith in the oneness of Allah and the fact 
that Muhammed was God’s prophet as the occasions arose. He tried to bring dervish 
                                               
10
 Of course, as many intellectuals accept, Kemalism did not exist as a political ideology suddenly and at once. It 
was greatly influenced many other ideas of the preceding time -Tanzimat Era in particular- the ones adopted by 
Young Ottomans and Young Turks, which were also influenced by the ideas spread after the French Revolution. 
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lodges and religious foundations into the fold against imperialism as much as possible.” 
(Perinçek in Atatürk 17) so that he could “gain the support of pious soldiers.” (Glyptis 
17) However, as Perinçek argues, Mustafa Kemal had “started an enlightenment 
struggle to undercut the Islamic ideology during the Independence War already.” 
(Perinçek in Atatürk 17). Even if one might disagree and claim that Mustafa Kemal did 
not wage a struggle against the religion of Islam altogether back in those days or never 
at all, we can clearly see that the feud between Kemalism and (political) Islam  
heightened -in countenance of Kemalism- after the republic was founded and Kemalism 
became the ideology in power with Mustafa Kemal in charge. The ultimate reason for 
this was the fact that Kemalism knew what kind of trajectory it was going to follow in 
terms of religion and Islam: as it was written officially in the party programme above, it 
was going to follow laicite.  That is to say,  laicite
11
 became “ the central tenet of 
Kemalism, the official ideology of the modernizing political elite in the Republican 
period.” (Azak 9) Therefore, a lot of steps had to be taken to abolish political Islam 
from the political sphere and as the French Jacobin tradition, religion was needed to be 
sent to the private sphere as a “matter of individual conscience.”(Azak 8). For such an 
outcome, some changes were made. 
A major institutional step in [the] secularization process was taken by the 
enactment of Law No. 431 ( ilafe in İlga ına  e  anedanı O maninin 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Memaliki Haricine Çıkarılma ına Dair Kanun), 
which abolished the Caliphate on 3 March 1924. The same law also 
abolished the function of Sheikh ul-Islam and the Ministries of Religious 
Affairs ( eriye) and Pious Foundations (Evkaf). Instead, a Directorate of 
Religious Affairs (Diyane  İşleri Rei liği) was charged with the 
administration of the mosques. (Azak 9) Italics, not mine. 
One message was surely being given with these steps/laws: Islam could not be 
political
12
. One can assume that once these revolutionary laws were enacted, the 
struggle against political Islam would stop or at least de-escalate because, besides one 
or two riots which are going to be discussed in a moment, we do not see serious 
attempts to bring Islam into the political domain in a reactionary manner. After all, not 
all of those riots were really for the sake of political Islam even though the term 
“reactionary” was uttered an used for the ongoing steps. According to professor Karpat, 
                                               
11
 Azak mentions that she prefers using “secularism” instead of “laicism/laicite” for Turkish context but that nominal 
discussion will not be made in this thesis and both terms will be used interchangeably.  
12
 Unless it was utilized by Kemalism itself.  
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for instance, İsmet İnönü government used Şeyh Said Riot as an excuse with the claim 
that it was working up for “reactionism”13. Most importantly, “any kind of a backward 
move to Islamic order was hardly one of the possibilities” (Akşin quoted in Azak 15) 
even in 1909 when the Ottoman Empire was weak to keep order. It was even more 
impossible to move back to any kind of Islamic order in an organized republic like 
Turkey. Obviously, one can claim that political Islam did not pose a serious threat to 
state and the new order so the struggle against Islam/Islamic images/political Islam
14
 
could be decreased. However, Islam/political Islam continued to occupy as much space 
in Kemalist agenda both in practice, and in language. In 1925, shrines and dervish 
lodges were officially closed
15. “After a while (1926) Islamic laws that were used until 
that day were abandoned with the enactment of Swedish Code Civil.” (Karpat 151).  On 
9th April 1928, [...] some laws of the constitution were changed and the statement of 
‘the religion of Turkish State is Islam’ was abated.” (Karpat 153). In addition to these 
developments, the adhan/azan (call to prayer) was recited in Turkish instead of 
Arabic.
16
 These and many others were the developments that took place or precautions 
that were made against Islam and/or Islamic style/imagery during 1920s and early 
1930s. Just as in practice, Islam and political Islam -and related lexicon- continued to 
take up much -if not increasing- space in Kemalist discourse towards the late 1920s and 
early 1930s so much so that Mustafa Kemal himself as a president seems to have 
showed an inclination towards the issue of Islam/political Islam personally in his own 
writings and speeches directed to public or made within his own circle. After all, of all 
of his statements about Islam and political Islam, the majority or at least the half were 
made after 1924 judging from the volume of his statements in the compilation prepared 
by Perinçek, which includes Mustafa Kemal’s expressions about Islam/political Islam, 
titled On Religion and Laicite (Din ve Laiklik Üzerine).  
But why? Why, after all that was said and done, did not the struggle and fear against 
Islam/political Islam de-escalate although there was not a real threat to the republic and 
although political Islam seems to have been taken under control by the state and the 
                                               
13
 Karpat, Kemal. Kı a T rkiye Tarihi 1800-2012. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları. 2012. p. 150. 
14
 Later in the thesis, I will explain why what is Islamic and what is Islamist was brought to the same level both here 
and in Kemalist mentality and psyche. 
15
 Karpat, Kemal. Kı a T rkiye Tarihi 1800-2012. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları. 2012. p. 151. 
16
 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal. Din ve Laiklik Üzerine. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2016. p. 260. 
12 
 
government thanks to the abovementioned laws and policies? Why did “[t]he specter of 
irtica [Islamic reactionism] continued to haunt the Kemalist regime, which after 1925, 
claimed dictatorial powers and silenced the opposition?” (Azak 16, italics not mine).  
 
2.2. Kemalism and its Discontents 
 
To be able to find some grounds and probable explanations of Kemalism’s paranoid 
gaze at Islam/political Islam, we need to go back and analyze its encounters with 
political Islam or/and Islam in general. It is clear that ideologies cannot be considered 
without certain people who formulate them. That is to say, personal experiences of the 
ideologues who bring certain convictions into existence cannot be separated from the 
quiddities of the ideologies in question.  Ergo, it would be far from absurd to claim that 
psychologically, parallel to the development of their ideologues, ideologies can also 
show a developments that is similar to the human beings’. Following such a reasoning, 
at least two deductions can be made. First, an analysis of the psyche of the ideologues 
may tell us a lot about the psyche and essence of the ideologies. Second, the analysis of 
developments of the ideologies can be made with the same theoretical tools and 
methodologies used for human beings with simple analogies.  As an ideology itself with 
a strong and salient founding ideologue, Kemalism can also be subjected to a similar 
methodology, as well. Can the paranoid style be traced back to the early experiences, 
which are important for any kind of psychological analysis, of the ideology and those of 
Mustafa Kemal’s? If so, what might be the governing dynamics for such a psyche and 
such a style? 
 
2.2.1 Paranoia 
 
Before everything else, it would be apt to clarify what is meant by the word paranoia 
which is one of the keywords of this thesis. “The word comes from the Greek parãnoia 
(=paranoia), which can be roughly translated with the term madness or craziness, from 
“para”=outside and “nous”=mind.” (Pretti and Cella xv). According to the Oxford 
13 
 
Dictionary, the disorder is explained as “[a] tendency to suspect or distrust other or to 
believe oneself unfairly used.” (quoted in Preti and Cella xv) In clinical psychology, the 
term has more nuances and depth and classification
17
 is much more complicated than 
my general formulation in terms of its classification but for the moment, what is 
important for this thesis is not how the illness is classified but how that state of mind is 
described which can help us better understand the paranoid style in question. 
According to Freeman and Garety’s formulation (2004) paranoid delusion 
can be defined with two characteristics:  1. The individual thinks that harm 
is occurring, or is going to occur, to him or her. 2. The individual thinks 
that the persecutor has the intention to cause harm. (Preti and Cella xvi) 
With the light of the explanations and definitions above, we can confidently put forward 
that -whether it is as extreme as paranoid schizophrenia or as intense as paranoid 
personality disorder (PPD)- the disorder is characterized by its fear of being harmed by 
others. Therefore, if we are going to talk about a paranoid style, the word harm and its 
derivatives together with fear and its own derivatives will be essential as we shall see 
later in thesis.  
Now that we have established a general outline of paranoia, it would be rational to look 
at the explanations and theories regarding the underlying reasons of the disorder and its 
symptoms. For such venture, it would be best to go into the domain of psychoanalysis 
which sits on the crossroads of both psychology and literature/culture in their ways of 
interpreting latent content and discourse. 
A first useful explanation and/or theory regarding the cause and the workings of the 
disorder come from Sigmund Freud. According to Freud, paranoia is formed by a wish 
for homosexuality (Freud Complete 62). Even though one may not see a direct 
relationship between homosexual drives and paranoia and that of between paranoia and 
personal/political behavior, at least three key concepts are extremely crucial to 
introduce for later analysis, namely “fixation”, “narcissism” and last not least 
“projection”. For him, narcissism is  
[...] a stage development in the libido which it passes through on the way 
to auto eroticism to object love. [...] What happens is this. There comes a 
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time in the development of the individual at which he unifies his sexual 
instincts (which have hitherto been engaged in auto erotic activities) in 
order to obtain a love-object; and he begins by taking himself, his own 
body, as his love object, and only subsequently proceeds from this to the 
choice of some person other than himself as his object. (Freud Complete 
60)  
As Freud himself explains clearly in the quotation that early in the development of 
every individual, there is a transitory stage where people direct their love to themselves. 
However, since it is a “half-way stage” (Freud Complete 61), narcissistic stage leaves 
its place to other stages in development
18
. If, according to Freud, people are stuck or 
“fixated” in this early phase of the development, they seem to be more liable to the 
disorder of paranoia. 
People who have not freed themselves completely from the stage of 
narcissism-who, that is to say- have at that point a fixation which may 
operate as a disposition to a later illness- are exposed to the danger that 
some unusually intense wave of libido, finding no other outlet, may lead to 
a sexualisation of their social instincts and so undo the sublimations which 
they had achieved in the course of their developments. [...] Since our 
analyses show that paranoics endevaour to protect themselves against any 
such sexualisation of their social instinctual cathexes, we are driven to 
suppose that the weak spot in their development is to be looked for 
somewhere between between the stages of auto erotism, narcissism and 
homosexuality. (Freud Complete 62) 
 As we understand, Freud makes it clear that paranoia or paranoid liabilities are 
the results of narcissism which is a defense mechanism to homosexual fears. How 
narcissism leads to paranoia will be exclusively important when we try to apply these 
theories to understand the Kemalist paranoid style. For now, it would be better if we 
first defined what narcissism is and second we looked at the reasoning behind 
narcissistic thinking leading up to paranoia since there seems to be a leap from 
narcissism to paranoia in the abovementioned quotation.  
Firstly, what do we mean when we talk about narcissism? This question will be of 
utmost importance when we seek narcissistic features in Kemalist discourse. For the 
features that can be defined as narcissistic, I am going to follow the outlines drawn by a 
Otto Kernberg who is claimed to be “the greatest19” analyst there is by many other 
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therapists and analysts. For him “[t]he primary characteristics of narcissistic 
personalities are grandiosity, excessive selfishness, and [...] the expectation of being 
shown admiration and appreciation.” (Kernberg Sınır 201). In addition to these traits, 
narcissistic people “talk about themselves aberrantly often” and “they envy others, 
idealize the ones from whom they expect narcissistic support and look down on the 
ones from whom they expect nothing.” (Kernberg Sınır 199).  
Secondly, how does narcissism cause paranoid thinking specifically?  Freud comes up 
with some explanatory mechanisms -or a patterns in reasoning, if you want- to answer 
the question. For him, “the proposition ‘I (a man) love him (a man) is contradicted by 
(a) ‘I do not love him -I hate him.’” (Freud Complete 63). Therefore, as Freud explains 
“[t]he proposition ‘I hate him’ becomes transformed by the projection onto another one: 
‘He hates me (persecutes me), which will justify me in hating him.” (Freud Complete 
63). What Freud is trying to say here is clear: the hate which one paranoidly thinks 
others have is the result of the hate (love in the first place) one has within 
himself/herself. Such formulation (theory of projection) has been among the foremost 
and the most accepted ones in explaining the paranoid disorder especially in 
psychoanalysis so much so that it has been formulated in the analyses of literary works 
when, for instance, Davis defined the gothic logic and its technique as “taking an object 
of desire and projecting it into the external world as an object of fear just as Freud’s 
textbook contention about paranoia [...]” (Davis 2) Theory of projection was also 
applied even by Hofstadter himself who was not a psychoanalyst but felt that a 
projection (of fear/aggression et cetera) was in hand and at work in American politics, 
as well. As he puts forwards “[i]t is hard to resist the conclusion that this enemy is on 
many counts the projection of the self; both the ideal and the unacceptable aspects of 
the self are attributed to him.” (Hofstadter 85). All of these studies on paranoia and 
paranoid thinking indicate one thing: an analysis about paranoia cannot be done without 
considering projection and narcissism; so, that is what I am going to do in this thesis 
later in this chapter and in upcoming chapters when I do my analyses on Kemalist 
paranoid style. However, before doing so, there are other theories on paranoia that 
needs introduction, which will be useful later in the essay. One of these theories will be 
one proposed by Melanie Klein, who “bases her studies on child psychoanalysis” (Klein 
7). If it is one of the tasks of this thesis to go into the first stages of the development of 
the ideology (its babyhood and childhood), it would be helpful to consult Klein, who 
16 
 
while focusing on the development of paranoia also uses projection theory but 
introduces at least one more key concept: envy -a feeling that narcissistic people 
possesses against other people, according to Kernberg’s classification. According to 
Klein, “envy is a oral-sadist and anal sadist expression of destructive impulses; it is 
effective from the beginning of life and has an idiosyncratic basis.” (Klein 18) Right 
from the beginning of her theory, Klein makes it clear that people are born with the 
feelings of aggressiveness and expresses it with the feeling of envy. Then, 
[i]n order to cope with the death instinct and the destructiveness that is 
present in its inner world, the baby projects part of its aggressiveness to 
the mother outside. Therefore, it splits the world (and the mother) as good 
and bad objects. [...] In other words, the fact that the baby splits the world 
with strong lines and perceives it as “good” and “bad” arises from its 
impulsive organisation. (Klein, 11) 
Let us make it clearer with more detail and try to explain the role of “split” in paranoid 
thinking. Everyone is born with some degree of aggressiveness with “envy” early in 
his/her development. The mechanics of such expression takes place as follows. When 
someone is born, she/he bonds with a primary object and it is seen as the source of life. 
That primary object is the mother’s breasts. (Klein 20) However, because of the 
competition between the death and life instincts
20
, the anxiety it produces and 
envy/aggressiveness are also directed to this primary object.  
The first object that is envied is the feeding breast because the baby 
assumes that this breast possesses everything [the baby] needs and it can 
give [the baby] endless milk and love but it keeps all of this for its own 
gratification. This feeling increases the baby’s resentment and hatred and 
thus the relationship with mother is also distorted. The excessiveness of 
hatred for me shows that the paranoid and schizoid traits are also 
exceedingly strong and such a baby needs to be considered as ill. (Klein 
25) 
But how does the hatred turn into the paranoid and schizoid traits? Klein provides us 
with another mechanism -the mechanism of “splitting” that I talked about- which we 
will utilize later in thesis. For Klein, the more one is laden with envy, the more she/she 
suffers from guilt and she/he experiences the guilt as a paranoid idea of being 
persecuted. “Another result of excessive envy is early feeling of guilt. If ‘I’ feels the 
guilt when it does not have power to carry it, then the feeling is experienced as 
persecution.” (Klein 39). Therefore, in order to get rid of this feeling of guilt, “I” splits 
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the world into “good” and “bad” and projects its bad straits to outside objects. This is 
also “one of the primitive defense mechanisms that “I” uses [...] to take control and gain 
domination on the object” (Klein 12). This process is called “projective identification” 
in Kleinian terminology. Whom the baby projects its bad traits to get rid of this feeling 
of guilt is has also been discussed by Klein through Oedipus complex, the explanation 
of which, again, will bear much importance for this thesis. As Klein explains, if the 
bond with the primary object is strong, then “the fear of losing the mother will not be 
great; thus the ability to share the mother will be developed.” (Klein 42). Therefore, if 
the bond with the primary object is weak, the paranoid liabilities will be greater thus it 
will affect how the Oedipus phase will be experienced. In Klein’s explanation Oedipus 
jealousy takes place “when the most of hatred is shifted from mother to father who is 
thought to possess the mother.” (Klein 43). Therefore, the father and other “rivals”21 
become the objects that are “bad” since they are the ones that are thought to possess the 
mother. In a non-paranoid human development,  the Oedipus phase is worked through 
and leaves its place to other phases in development, leaving the feeling of jealousy 
behind. “However, if paranoid and schizoid mechanisms are too strong, jealousy -and 
envy in the last instance- stays as it is.”, which might result in a “permanent impairment 
in the baby’s relationship with both the mother and the father.” (Klein 43). This 
impairment will be discussed later in thesis when we look at its role in Kemalist 
ideology.  
 
2.2.2. Laius’s Oedipus Conflicts 
 
All of the abovementioned statements are some of the foundational theories concerning 
paranoia and paranoid thinking. My suggestion is that if a paranoid style is persistent in 
the psyche of politicians and political discourse, then, we should be able to apply 
theories both to the agents as a group- and the ideology itself at a metaphorical level.  
 Trying to explain societal and political conflicts and phenomena through 
psychoanalysis and Oedipal complex is not new. Many scholars have done so before, 
some of whom I am going to refer to in this thesis. For instance, the psychoanalyst 
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Kernberg has tried to see the resemblances between the formation of paranoia and its 
relationship and results in bureaucratic formations within states. As for Turkey, we see 
similar if not a more radical approach to the relationship between Oedipus complex and 
the workings of the state and or civilization. In his attempt to understand the “crisis” 
within the “minds and inner humans” of ours, Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar, talks about a 
“duality caused by the transition from one civilization to another” (Tanpınar 34) and 
vaguely claims at some point in his article that as a civilization and individuals we “[...] 
have been living in Oedipus complex, that’s the complex of a man who killed his own 
father without knowing it, since Tanzimat.” (Tanpınar 38). As one of the most 
important intellectuals of Turkish history of ideas and novelists, Tanpınar chose to use 
Oedipus complex, a psychoanalytic term, to understand or rather illustrate the psyche of 
the society and that, in my opinion, is important to note in terms of the range that 
psychoanalysis encompasses in critical theory within various disciplines.  
Tanpınar is not alone in sensing Oedipal complexities felt within the society and its 
psyche. In his attempt to conceive of an allegorical interpretation of Hamlet by 
Kemalists in 1970s, Bülent Somay also turns his face to psychoanalysis. For Bülent 
Somay, in  amle  ‘70, directed by Algan at the time,  
[...] we were Hamlet, the youth. The ghost of the father was Mustafa 
Kemal and the ghost was warning us about the fact that the State, the 
mother Republic [...] was being subjected and raped by right wing/pro-
American politics and even by Demirel
22
 himself and it was calling us to 
protect the Republic despite the governors and them in accordance with 
the spirit of  the “Address to Youth”. (Somay Çokbilmiş 92) 
In his attempt to understand the importance of the allegory
23
, Somay tries to understand 
some political events and the psyche of that generation with Oedipal drives. For 
instance, the sees the 1971 Turkish military memorandum as Kemalists’ “effort to 
create a positive father figure and to ingratiate themselves with that father.” (Somay 
Çokbilmiş 111). Later in his article, he goes on his analyses to conclude that “in our 
gaze towards the society and politics, we need not have to be the Oedipal children who 
cannot detach from their mother.” (Somay Çokbilmiş 113). From his optimist 
deduction, we understand that Somay also believes, like Tanpınar, the society and its 
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approach to politics are suffering from Oedipus conflicts. Obviously, as in Somay’s and 
Algan’s cases, people focused on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s influence on the society and 
politics as I am going to do. However, what has not yet been emphasized enough, I 
claim, has been the causes of such a psychological state. Yes, the state of Oedipus as a 
son has been analyzed here and there with regards to the relationship between the 
society and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. I contend, however, that the psyche and the 
discourse of the father have not yet been construed enough. In general, everybody tends 
to talk about the conflicts of Oedipus; yet, they often forget the fact that Laius, the 
father of Oedipus, had his psychological conflicts, as well. He himself was a child of a 
father, after all. Therefore, in any attempt to talk about Oedipal conflicts, if possible, we 
should also talk about the relationship between Laius, whom Oedipus kills, and his 
father. In our case, the society, Kemalists in particular I claim, has their ongoing 
conflicts in their roles as Oedipus, with Mustafa Kemal who represents Laius. 
Therefore, to better understand the paranoid psyche prevalent in politics, we had better 
have a look at the relationship between Mustafa Kemal and his father figures in politics 
since while we are dealing with the problems/conflicts of ours with our own father, we 
either directly or indirectly also deal with the one that our fathers have with their fathers 
which has a lot to do in forming of our fathers’ psyche.  It is important to note that since 
what we are trying to grasp and explain here is the political psychology, what should be 
subject to analysis should be Mustafa Kemal and his relationship with his father figures 
in political domain with whom he conflicts and competes for the sake of a mother figure 
in political life (the motherland, the republic). In Kemalists’ and Turkish society's case, 
I repeat, we may not have only inherited our father’s (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, meaning 
the father of the Turks) legacy and republic, but we also received his traumas, psyche, 
state of mind and lexicon related to these. Who was the figure in question whom 
Mustafa Kemal had conflicts with? Upon reading Mustafa Kemal’s speeches and 
writings
24
, I have realized the existence of strong figures as such whose names are 
repeated countless times in the abovementioned materials: the Sultans of the time, 
especially Vahdettin (Mehmet VI), who was the head  of the Empire when the War of 
Independence started. I put forward that his conflicting relationship with the sultans, 
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especially Vahdettin, has contributed a lot to political character and its “split” shape and 
style.  
Just after the struggle for independence started, we can see that Mustafa Kemal-as-
soldier and as-politician-to-come has stated his loyalty and belief in the sultanate and 
caliph multiple times until he secures the country and his position as a politician by 
stating that “[he] would always be the guardian of the supreme sultanate and caliphate 
and royal Turkish nation [...]” (Atatürk Din 34) and that “the chair of sultanate, by also 
being the chair of the caliphate, our Sultan, is the head of Muslim people” (Atatürk Din 
43) and by wishing that may God protect the sultanate and caliphate (Atatürk Din 35). 
At this phase, we do not realize much of a conflict between Mustafa Kemal and the 
sultan of the time, Vahdettin, who was also the caliph of Islam. However, as Doğu 
Perinçek observes and as the history has proven itself to be true, Mustafa Kemal’s 
purpose was actually not “ to defend nor save the sultanate” but “on the contrary, to get 
rid of the sultan [...]” (Atatürk Din 16). That is to say, he was acting like a 
Machiavellist
25
. After the War of Independence was fought, then won and the republic 
was founded, we get to see what Mustafa Kemal-as-a-politician really thinks of the 
sultanate and the chair of the caliphate. On 25
th
 of September, 1920, Mustafa Kemal 
was recorded uttering:  
[...] Unfortunately, the person who holds the positions of sultanate and 
caliphate is a treacherous man for this nation. [...] This person who has the 
epithets of sultan and caliph has got some organizations of factiousness 
that he is personally busy in deceiving and ruining this nation. [...] [t]his 
person is a traitor. He is the tool of our enemies against the land and 
nation. (Atatürk Din 51) 
We see that, even in the state of war, Mustafa Kemal utters these words both to the 
chair of sultanate and caliphate, a position whose influence Mustafa Kemal tried to 
utilize at the war. During one of his visits of the time, Mustafa Kemal utters the 
following: 
There is no place on this land for caliphs and sultans, who do not hesitate 
to adapt the continuation of their personal interests, sultanate and 
debauchery in Istanbul to the enemies’ goal of invading our motherland, to 
cooperate with them,  to resign to the wants of the enemy states and who 
do not have consciences and who do not abstain from treacherous efforts 
                                               
25
 Başkaya, Fikret   aradı gmanin İfla ı Re mi İdeolo inin  leş iri ine  iriş Ba ılılaşma, Çağdaşlaşma, Kalkınma  
İstanbul: Doz Yayınları. 1991. p. 99. Print.  
21 
 
to break the determination of our nation to live freely and independently. 
(Atatürk Din 112)  
These lines were uttered during a visit of an Anatolian city in 1925, two years after the 
foundation of the republic and one year after the abolishment of the caliphate. Even 
after the foundation of the republic, Mustafa Kemal’s position as the head of the state 
was secured
26, and the sultanate and the caliphate were abolished, Mustafa Kemal’s 
conflicts  with a sultan/caliphate and most importantly the emphasis of them being 
“treacherous” did not end, if not intensified. The most important ideological source of 
Mustafa Kemal, Nutuk (The Great Speech), recited in 1927, also starts with a similar 
emphasis on Vahdettin, who was the sultan and the caliph when Mustafa Kemal was 
mobilized to wage war on occupying states in 1919.  He says: “Vahdettin, the 
degenerate occupant of the throne and the Caliphate, was seeking for some despicable 
way to save his person and his throne, the only object of his anxiety.” (Atatürk A 
Speech 1). Of course, the discussion of Vahdettin does not end there, and his 
“treacherous” behavior is mentioned and commented continuously throughout the 
speech. For instance, when Mustafa Kemal talks about the abolishment of sultanate 
together with Vahdettin’s displacement of the country and then his title as caliph, he 
spares a harsh commentary on him.  
Indeed, it is sad to think that a creature like Vahdettin, who was low 
enough to consider that his life and liberty could have been in danger 
from whatever cause it might be, in the midst of  his own people, had 
been able to stand even for a single moment at the head of the nation. It 
is fortunate that the nation has driven this wretch [...] and has put an end 
thereby to the long parade of his baseness. [...] An incapable and low 
creature without heart or intelligence might well place himself under the 
protection of any foreigner [...]. (Atatürk A Speech 579-580)  
In her article, “National Myths and Self-Na(rra)tions”, Hülya Adak talks about Mustafa 
Kemal’s rhetorical style in Nutuk, and rightfully points out to the use of the pronoun 
“I”, which sets the point of view of events narrated in Nutuk, and asserts that “[t]he 
transcendent, unchanging self of Nutuk points to one of the most foregrounded myths in 
Nutuk, the myth of the narrator of Nutuk as the unique/sole hero or secular prophet in 
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Turkish history.
27” (Adak 515) We understand from Adak’s rationalization that Nutuk 
serves as a book to set an identity proper for Mustafa Kemal.  
[...] Nutuk is a cyclical and repetitive account of a self with a prophetlike 
calling to rescue the nation.This self’s others, the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph 
and the political opponents of Mustafa Kemal, are likewise denied 
development or maturation and remain unchanged as the self’s others 
throughout Nutuk. (Adak, 515) 
I agree with Adak on the assertion that with the type of language he chooses to use 
Mustafa Kemal, separates himself from his others. The fact that he opens Nutuk, with 
how “I” acted against how “Vahdettin” acted shows that he wants to draw a line 
between himself and others (Vahdettin in particular) who acted differently. Thus, the 
mechanism of splitting seems to be at work here. “I” the good is against Vahdettin, the 
bad. We have seen multiple times so far that Mustafa Kemal uses a certain pejorative 
language towards Vahdettin with nouns and adjectives like “hain (traitor, treacherous), 
alçak (low), yaratık (creature) and so on. By doing so, Mustafa Kemal shows he is the 
exact opposite of his other, as one may expect. Yet, such language also reveals the 
psyche he was in and how he felt towards Vahdettin as well. Therefore, the language 
Mustafa Kemal with its pejorative, splitting and dichotomous tone shows us the hints of 
conflict Mustafa Kemal-as-politician had with Vahdettin, the Sultan and the Caliph. 
And it seems that it was a never-ending conflict. Just as the Nutuk started with a 
reference to Vahdettin as a traitor, it ended with a more comprehensive one that 
definitely included Vahdettin within its range. The lines are from the famous speech 
referred as “Address to the Turkish Youth” which ends Nutuk:  
Turkish Youth! your primary duty is ever to preserve and defend the 
national Independence, the Turkish Republic. [...] In the future, too, there 
will be ill-will, both in the country itself and abroad, which will try to tear 
this treasure from you [...] that they have, through craft and force, taken 
possession of all the fortresses and arsenals of the [Homeland]
28
. 
Assuming. in order to look still darker possibilities in the face, that those 
who hold the power of Government within the country have fallen into 
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error, that they are fools or traitors, yes, even that these leading persons 
identify their personal interests with the enemy's political goals, it might 
happen that the nation came into complete privation, into the most extreme 
distress: that it found itself in a condition of ruin and complete exhaustion. 
Even under those circumstances, O Turkish child of future generations! it 
is your duty to save the independence, the Turkish Republic. (Atatürk A 
Speech 740-741) 
If we consider his previous writings, speeches and the kind of language he previously 
used, it is not hard to conclude that by “traitors who equate their goals with those of the 
enemies”, Mustafa Kemal warns the future generations of people like Vahdettin. It is 
important to note that, at this point of Nutuk, Mustafa Kemal uses some signifiers such 
as “traitor”, “crafters” , “error” doers without a clear signified such as Vahdettin. Again, 
we may understand that the group of “signified” people include Vahdettin but Mustafa 
Kemal does not limit his references by stating a clear name, thus leaves questions marks 
over the signified person/people. I contend that such a choice of a vague reference -
either made consciously or unconsciously- in a text that is of great importance to 
Turkish society
29
 adds a lot to the paranoid psyche and style of the society, Kemalists in 
particular, if it is not one of the primary causes in the first place. Here, the trait of being 
treacherous is no longer the fault of a single man, Vahdettin but it can be possessed by 
anyone -those holding the power
30
 in particular. Therefore, Mustafa Kemal also 
bequeaths its followers another -this time unspoken- duty: the constant duty of 
identifying possible traitors who are there somewhere plotting against or disposing of 
the motherland/nation/the Republic for their own interests since as Mustafa Kemal 
                                               
29
 “Address to the Turkish Youth” is one of the most recognized texts in Turkish context because, for decades, every 
student from every level has been made recite the text. In addition, the text has been hung on the walls of not only 
almost every school in the nation but also of almost every classroom. Also, it is  a speech with which “Atatürk binds 
national consciousness with the republic’s protection” (Glyptis 15). Last not least, it has been made to put in the first 
few pages of every textbook together with a portrait of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. From all these encounters, one can 
grasp the scope of familiarity of the Turkish society with “Address to the Turkish Youth”, which contains elements 
of paranoid style with its references to indefinable traitors. For Glyptis, such familiarity especially in education “[...] 
creates a tight nexus of meaning, permitting Kemalist ‘vocabulary and syntax’ to pervade a child’s work and leisure 
time.”, which intensifies the effect and expands the scope further in the society. 
30
 As we have seen in “Address to the Turkish Youth” and previous instances, Mustafa Kemal is particularly more 
conflicted with those who are involved in selfish/treacherous activities and who at the same time have much power to 
damage motherland/nation/ the Republic such as the Sultan/Caliph and people who hold government positions.  Why 
this conflict is important in particular will be discussed in a few lines. 
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makes it clear: “[i]n the future, too, there will be ill-will, both in the country itself and 
abroad [...]
31” (Atatürk A Speech 740). 
Questions of utmost importance still persist: Why did Mustafa Kemal’s conflicts as a 
politician did not end with Vahdettin and who were the possible traitors Mustafa Kemal 
talks about in his Nutuk? This is where, I put forward, the mechanics of Oedipus 
conflicts and the aforementioned metaphors seem to be at work. I claim that within the 
domain of politics, the primal
32
 object of desire that is seen as the source of life is will 
to power, which can be represented anything through which power is obtained: nation, 
motherland, bureaucracy and so on. To put it in another way, just like a baby or a 
human being considers milk as the source of life and desires mother (and her breasts) as 
the source of milk, subjects considers the power as the source of their existence and 
desires anything that channels that power, be it motherland, the nation to rule, the 
parliament and so on. If the metaphor is extended, those who want to obtain the power 
(milk) are to be found in a desire over the motherland, the nation and so on (mother) 
which in turn is expected to lead to conflicts/competition with that who already holds 
the power or means of power (a father figure possessing the mother)
33
. In Mustafa 
Kemal’s case, it was Vahdettin (a sultan, father figure34) who possessed the power to 
rule and to have the means of power while Mustafa Kemal and his friends were in 
desire thus conflict with Vahdettin to gain that power over the motherland
35
. Let us 
remember once again the lines uttered by Mustafa Kemal: “There is no place on this 
land for caliphs and sultans, who do not hesitate to adapt the continuation of their 
                                               
31
 The rightness and the necessity of such style in the text and Nutuk in general will not be discussed within this 
thesis since it is not its claim to do so. Some may argue that traitors and similar plotters may exist in any political 
context, and I may agree with them. However, this thesis does not claim to pass normative judgements over historical 
events and actions at this level but rather does analyses over discourses that were already produced by the agents of 
the time. 
32
 Ultimate, too. 
33
 This formulation also suggests the following in reel-politics: any type of opposition is expected to be found in an 
Oedipal conflict with the people who hold the power and means of power in their hands. 
34
 Somay talks about the idea that the sultan was also produced and seen as a father in Ottoman Empire (Somay 
Psychopolitics 139) 
35
 Of course, I do not deny the fact that Mustafa Kemal had also conflicts with the Western intruders but his conflict 
with them is not something we can explain with Oedipus complex. Mustafa Kemal and his friends’ conflicts with 
them can be likened to the one Hamlet has towards Claudius. Yet, such a conflict and its analysis cannot be included 
in a thesis like this which seeks to understand Kemalism and its gaze towards political Islam. 
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personal interests, sultanate and debauchery in Istanbul to the enemies’ goal of invading 
our motherland.” (Atatürk Din 112) Clearly, Mustafa Kemal is directing his anger 
towards a Sultan-Caliph (a father figure) who is letting intruders possess the mother-
land. Would it be far-fetched to claim that such a language and picture suggest that the 
mother was either getting  or trying to be raped by foreigners and the father was helping 
them do it; in front of their children? 
Even if we would go as far to accept that an Oedipal mechanism is at work, it would not 
alone explain Mustafa Kemal’s and Kemalism’s rage and hatred towards Vahdettin 
which in turn cause Mustafa Kemal to use words like “low, creature, treacherous, 
heartless” since all of these ideas and imputations to Vahdettin would show a tendency 
to fade away after Mustafa Kemal finally obtains the power and motherland. Yet, this 
did not turn out to be the case for him and his ideology. After all, the excerpts that I am 
analyzing and have quoted are from an era in which Mustafa Kemal already had and 
secured his power and position. So, the conflict somehow lingered. But why could not 
Mustafa Kemal and the ideology in general put an end to the conflict even after they 
gained the power they sought? And why is this important for Kemalism and its paranoid 
gaze towards political Islam?  
In an ordinary human development, everyone goes through Oedipus conflicts regardless 
of their sex. However, as Klein puts it, the conflicts normally seem to be coped with and 
then overcome and this is actually how a strong personality is built. However, as we can 
see, Kemalist ideology did or could not at all end its conflict with its father figure 
(Vahdettin and sultanate) as, it can be claimed, they projected all of their bad and guilty 
traits to father because of the excessive hatred it possessed. Therefore, I contend that the 
fact that Kemalism and Mustafa Kemal-as-politician could not end its conflicts with its 
father figures stems from the fact that it was stuck in early and primitive stages of 
human development- and political maturity in that sense. Can this be the reason why as 
Adak rightfully observes that “[t]his self’s others, the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph and the 
political opponents of Mustafa Kemal, are likewise denied development or maturation 
and remain unchanged as the self’s others throughout Nutuk.” (Adak 515). It seems to 
me that as a parallel to what has been claimed above, it is the type of self, ideology, 
discourse that actually lack “development and maturation” and it projects it onto their 
“others”. As for the importance of the explanation for Kemalism and its paranoid gaze 
towards political Islam, Kemalism can still be claimed to be stuck in those early and 
26 
 
primitive stages in this day and age. Whether this claim that Kemalism as an ideology is 
stuck in an early stage has truth in itself is the question this thesis has embarked on to 
find an answer for. 
Now that we have discussed some Oedipal mechanisms and their possible effects at 
work, we can go back to the claim put forward at the end of 2.2.1, when we discussed 
the results of “splitting” and “narcissism” leading up to impairment in the relationship 
with father and mother. We have seen how Kemalism has had its impaired relationship 
with its father with traces of Oedipus conflicts
36
. If we also add the mechanism of 
splitting together with its results and narcissism into the equation, Kemalism’s ongoing 
paranoid gaze and its issues with political Islam can start to make more sense. The 
harsh splitting done due to the hatred/envy towards the father and narcissistic traits led 
to a drawing of the framework of what “bad” could and would be. Whatever the “bad” 
is, it should have the same or similar characteristics of the father figure. In other words, 
what and who has the characteristics of the father figure should be “bad”. Together with 
his other characteristics Mustafa Kemal and Kemalism attributed to Vahdettin and his 
antecedents such as cowardice and lowness, Vahdettin and his antecedents were also the 
figures on whom the traits of “political” and “Islam”37 came together due to a sultan 
being both the head of the state and the head of all Muslim people.  That Mustafa 
Kemal and other Kemalists dealt a lot with the title of “Caliph” after the republic was 
founded can also strengthen the point that any Islamic/Islamist element in power was 
categorized/split aside as “bad” both then and later in Turkish political setting. Whether 
this claim that the ideology stigmatized such movements as “bad” has truth in itself is 
the question this thesis has embarked on to find answer for. 
 
2.2.3. Historical Instances 
Besides the psychoanalytic explanations made clear above, there might have been other 
causes of a paranoid style being developed by Kemalists towards political Islam that 
made the ideology and the ideologues setting themselves apart from political Islam, 
                                               
36
 It means that Laius also had Oedipus’ conflicts within his psyche. 
37
 I do not mean to call the ideology of Sultan/Caliph at the time as “political Islam” unlike Abdulhamid II, whose 
ideology was referred to as Islamism. However, it is important to note that a sultan/caliph with its constituent titles 
evokes the political ideology at hand.  
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whether we call them instances that caused splitting or traumas, or certain political 
positionings. After all, we know that some historical events might cause paranoia in 
societies
38
. Among the first one of these historical instances was March 31 event, 
against which Mustafa Kemal himself was personally involved. The incident, “a mutiny 
by soldiers which has since been known as an Islamic revolt against the Young Turk 
government” (Azak, 15) occurred because of “provocations” of an extreme Islamist 
newspaper
39
.  The incident lasted for thirteen days and it was ended by the military 
unit/army that included Mustafa Kemal “Hareket Ordusu” (the Army of Action). For 
Kemalists, the incident is referred to as “reactionary” endeavor which “turned out to 
have an Islamic essence after the participation and the propaganda of Islamic fanatics.” 
(Aytepe 2017). The picture becomes clearer here with the agents involved in this 
incident: Islamist extremists who are targeting and even capturing the power on one 
side against the new regime and Mustafa Kemal on the other clashing with one another. 
Again, whether we call it splitting, trauma or political/military feud, Mustafa Kemal and 
political Islam crossed paths in this big event that had far-reaching effects following it. 
The way “the second man” of Kemalism, the prime-minister of Atatürk and the 
following president of the republic after Mustafa Kemal, İsmet İnönü, talks about the 
incident is of utmost importance as to see how the incident influenced and put a scar on 
the psches of Kemalists.  
The event retained its traumatic effect on most of the leaders of the 
Republic such as İsmet İnönü (1884–1973), the second President of the 
Republic after Atatürk. İnönü was to write in his memoirs, published in the 
weekly magazine Akis as late as 1959, that he always recalled “the 
catastrophe of March 31” as “the collapse of a big building”, a reaction to 
the young constitutional regime which created “an ever-lasting atmosphere 
of insecurity.” (Azak 15) 
It is important to note the word  “insecurity” in İnönü’s statements. The word alone 
emphasizes how influentially detrimental the event was on Kemalists’ psyches even so 
many years after it occurred. If the “ever-lasting atmosphere of insecurity” is not a 
paranoid feeling, then what is? 
                                               
38
 For instance, we know that -as Somay reports from Belge- Russian War created a paranoia directed foreign 
countries. It is credible to think that some inner events might have caused a paranoid gaze within the country.  
39
 Karpat, Kemal. Kı a Türkiye Tarihi 1800-2012. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları. 2012. p. 86. 
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31 March Incident was not the only event where Mustafa Kemal and the ideology-in-
the-making crossed paths with political Islam or Islamic politics. There were also a few 
riots and certain resistance
40
 by some Islamists against the new regime after the republic 
was founded. Among those were Menemen Incident and The Sheikh Said Rebellion 
both of which had an Islamic essence in their making especially the former which had 
more Islamist agenda in its desire to enunciate Sharia (Hür 2012), the Islamic Law than 
the latter one, which was a Kurdish nationalist rebellion against the regime
41
. Therefore, 
these events that had all-encompassing outcomes, too, in Turkish social and political 
context may have been effective in the process of marking “bad” label the Kemalists 
put on any plane where Islam and politics come closer to each other or/and directly 
political Islam itself.  
What is also worth noting is that Mustafa Kemal personally knew what would happen if 
any Islamic element would be added for the sake of pragmatic outcomes in politics. He 
personally utilized the imagery and language of Islam during the War of Independence, 
during which he tried to use the title of Caliph to gather some help both within the 
country, an attempt which may be claimed to have worked and from the Islamic world, 
an attempt which eventually failed. Even though the call for help from other Islamic 
agents failed, Atatürk utilized the language and the imagery of Islam to get the power. 
Therefore, it can be claimed that he knew Islam provided some help to way to power 
and he could rightfully be afraid that others would do the same to access power. He 
knew Islam as a populist and a pragmatist tool could be used against Kemalist ideology 
in power since he saw that the Turkish sociology was liable to the effects of Islamic 
elements. This  might have played a role in the making of the paranoid psyche of the 
ideology was suffering from against political Islam, as well. 
Up until now, we have seen the possible explanations of the paranoid style used in 
Kemalist discourse from different fields of study such as psychoanalysis, discourse 
analysis, history, sociology and so on. My claim is that if there is a trace of truth in what 
I have demonstrated so far in terms of the paranoid style of Kemalist ideology, we 
would see an adaptation of a similar style/discourse after the influence of Islamic 
                                               
40
 That of a famous Islamic cleric Said Nursi comes to mind who has been influential in Turkish Islamic circle.  
41
 Even though the Sheikh Said Rebellion was a Kurdish Rebellion (Zurcher 247), with a strong Sheikh figure being 
the leader, it had a strong Islamic visual and undertone, as well. 
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elements re-gained popularity and then re-claimed the power in Turkish politics after 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. In politics, this style is obvious as we have already seen 
at the beginning of the introduction. If Kemalist ideology is as influential as I foresee it 
is, we would see the existence of a paranoid style in literature and culture, as well, 
which have been other fields for Kemalist propaganda for decades as we have seen 
from the case of Esendal and countless other writers. The following chapters will try to 
prove the aforementioned foresight through the Kemalist canon produced after the 
1990s and 2000s. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PARANOID STYLE IN KEMALIST POPULAR CULTURE 
 
If we are trying to see how much a paranoid style is ingrained within a group of people 
or a society is general, one of the first domains of reference must be the popular culture, 
since by nature,  popular culture is formed through the insight of the masses.
42
  
One reason for attending to popular culture is the fact that there is an 
important relationship between the construction and maintenance of 
collective identities, and the manifestation and articulation of these 
identities within popular culture. Popular culture provides an outlet for 
imagining groups and disseminating the myths surrounding who belongs 
and who is an “Other.” (Nieguth and Wilton 4-9) 
As such, the study of popular Kemalist literature and cultural domain would bear a great 
significance if we would like to uncover and analyze the “articulation” of Kemalist 
identity against (political) Islamic ones. Psychoanalytically speaking, the domain of 
popular culture would also tell us a lot about the mindsets and psyches that a certain 
group is in. After all, like Nieguth and Wilton claims, popular culture has the “ability to 
reflect (and invite reflection on) social cleavages.” (2015 4) The study of these 
cleavages, put intentionally or set unconsciously like slip-of-tongues as Freud would 
claim would help us understand the psyches and the liabilities of certain groups and that 
is what this chapter is intended to do in the case of Kemalists and their paranoid style 
and psyche. 
 
                                               
42
 Or the insight of the masses is set through popular culture, as Adorno and Horkheimer would argue. Even so, such 
a culture reflects the insight of the masses in return, whether it has been fabricated or not. 
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3.1. Judging the Book by Its Cover and Its Title 
 
Secretly Elected: “You Did Not Elect Them; They Elected You” (Figure 1), (Gizli 
Seçilmişler: You Did No  Choose Them; They Chose You), Circulation: 230.000 by 
Soner Yalçın. This is how one of the bestselling books in Turkey is presented to readers 
by its cover on which there is a black shady upper hand on the top, dusting and 
dropping random black skulls. Whenever one visits the online bookseller OdaKitap, one 
can often -if not all the time- come across a book which is promoted in a similar fashion 
under “bestsellers” section. In the recent years, I have come to realize a distinguished 
presence of bestsellers which are advertised by the promotion of certain elements. 
Therefore, the study of these elements would be helpful in uncovering the claim 
whether or not Kemalist canon is aiming directly at a paranoid psyche and/or 
constructing such a psyche. Two distinct ones of these elements are the book titles 
abounding with the feelings such as “dispossessing, losing, being in the middle of 
conspiracies,  being deceived and/or being able to be the one to uncover the hidden 
conspiracies”. Among those books, some are as follows: Why Have Turkey Been 
Sacrificed (Türkiye Neden Feda Edildi?) and AKP as a Project of the USA (Figure 2) 
(Bir ABD Projesi Olarak AKP) by Merdan Yanardağ; Israel: Game of States from the 
Nile  o  he  uphra e  (I rael: Nil’den Fıra ’a De le  Oyunları) and The Secret Cult in 
The Castle (Figure 3) (Saraydaki Gizli Tarikat) by Erdal Sarızeybek; The Struggle of 
 ower  roup  from The O  oman  mpire  o  he Republic (O manlı’dan Cumhuriye e 
  ç Odaklarının M cadele i) by İlker Başbuğ, Who Are You Deceiving? (Siz Kimi 
Kandırıyor unuz?)”by Soner Yalçın; The Fish On The Hook: Turkey (Figure 4) 
(Ol adaki Balık T rkiye) by M. Emin Değer. In a similar fashion, the covers of the same 
books also contain certain figures inducing paranoid thinking have such as “a white 
mask being held straight ahead by two hands it in front of a black background”, “certain 
cuts crossing out the words of the title including the word “Turkey”, “Uncle Sam’s hat 
on top of a bulb, which is the symbol of AKP”. Of course, as it was put forward at the 
beginning of the Introduction in line with Hofstadter, such a style could be expected 
from any political group and context since a paranoid style is not exclusive to American 
politics and is prevalent in Turkish political context -Kemalist circles in this case- as 
well. Therefore, it is not very surprising to come across books on everyday politics that 
have certain paranoid elements as such. What is more intriguing is the frequent 
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existence of such elements in literature -Kemalist literature in this case- and their shared 
aesthetics/style with the one utilized in politics. Among those are some of the most 
popular writers of this day such as Ahmet Ümit, Selim İleri43, Ataol Behramoğlu, Zülfü 
Livaneli.
44
 The similarities of the books of these writers with the abovementioned 
political books inducing paranoid books are self-evident. For instance, the book by 
Ahmet Ümit is titled as Farewell, My Fair Homeland! (Figure 5) (Elveda Güzel 
Va anım) with a caption reading as “The depths of the state are darker than the depths 
of soil.”, on the cover of which there are two Turkish flags behind a shady male figure 
wearing a calpac resembling the one in the famous Mustafa Kemal Kocatepe photo.  
(Ümit, Cover Page). At first sight, regardless of the story inside the book, one can read 
the book as if the homeland was being taken away from someone, which is a feeling 
resembling the one Mustafa Kemal was talking about at the beginning of Nutuk, where 
the motherland was being invaded by other states. The phrase “regardless of the story 
being told inside the book” is important to emphasize because as a writer aiming at the 
readers of the popular culture who are liable to judge a book by its title and its cover, 
Ahmet Ümit is utilizing -again either knowingly since he might have sensed that books 
promoted in this fashion are sold out quickly or unknowingly under the effects of 
unconscious drives- paranoid elements immediately at the cover already, meaning what 
is told inside the book does not have to be so paranoid. What is important is that once 
such a book is produced, it is either the result of the paranoia prevalent in Turkish 
context -Kemalist circles in this case- or it itself is creating such a style/sense/style, both 
of which mean that we can talk about a certain existence of paranoia. For the most part, 
I associate such a feeling of paranoia with the Kemalists not because Ahmet Ümit is a 
Kemalist writer
45
 because first, the imagery used in the cover is very similar to the 
imagery of Kemalists, with Turkish flags, shadowy people/images and so on and 
second, Kemalists are among the most populated and influential group being at the 
opposition that are dispossessed of the political power and/or motherland. A very 
                                               
43
 Selim İleri may not be recognized immediately as a Kemalist; he may not even be one after all. However, it is 
important to note a literary figure who utilizes similar paranoid elements intentionally or without realizing just like 
some Kemalist writers do. 
44
 Some of whom will be analyzed later in the thesis in detail.  
45
 Again, even though he posts photos of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk from his twitter account, Ahmet Ümiit may not be 
a self-proclaimed Kemalist; however, that is not really important if he is utilizing and contributing to that feeling of 
paranoia with Kemalist imagery.  
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similar title is seen to have been adopted by Selim İleri for a theatre play, which has 
become popular recently thanks to a number of different stagings: Farewell Republic! 
(Allahaı marladık Cumhuriye ). Again, a sense of the republic is being taken away 
and/or the republic disappearing is highlighted for the sake of and thanks to popular 
attraction. Another literary book mentioned above that uses a similar style in its title and 
cover is So Many Traitors! (Figure 6) (Ne Çok Hain) by Ataol Behramoğlu, who will 
take up a lengthy space of his own with the type of discourse he uses against political 
Islam later in the thesis. On the cover of this book, we again have a white mask in front 
of a dark grey background with a few lines selected from the book which include “How 
suddenly you changed!/ [...] in the icy waters of selfishness”, lines implying that some 
people have gone “astray” due to their personal interests. It is important to note that like 
Mustafa Kemal blaming Vahdettin for following his personal interest albeit the 
nation’s, Ataol Behramoğlu is blaming “the other(s)” for being after their personal 
interests. In addition, the use of mask is also noteworthy since it implies a certain 
“pretending/acting” while in reality a face/a trait is being hidden. Again, someone is 
trying to deceive someone and/or pretending to be someone else for treacherous ends as 
in other numerous covered/uncovered cases. Another popular writer who has chosen to 
aim at certain paranoid feelings of the society - Kemalist in particular- is Zülfü Livaneli, 
who features the idea of losing something/the idea is something is being taken. The first 
book which exhibits these ideas is Farewell to My Friend, belonging to juvenile 
literature. Different from the other writers, Zülfü Livaneli’s book puts a huge Atatürk 
portrait on its cover, with words comprising of the title on his calpac in front a partly 
sunny and cloudy sky background. Here, one might say that the book chose its cover 
aptly since the book talks about the instances from Mustafa Kemal’s life and finally, his 
death. However, it is undeniable that the word “farewell” is an acknowledgement of 
Atatürk being taken away in some way, which may ultimately imply that it is Kemalism 
that is being taken away and the book bids Mustafa Kemal/Kemalism its farewell with 
its title. Livaneli’s other book Shadows (Figure 7) (Gölgeler) also puts an Atatürk 
portrait at the center of the cover with some literary figures such as Halide Edip Adıvar 
and Yaşar Kemal. What strikes one at the first sight about the portrait used on the cover 
is the sorrow on Mustafa Kemal’s face. With one of the ultimate paranoid concepts of 
“shadow” in the title, the sorrow on Mustafa Kemal’s face arouses the feelings of 
Mustafa Kemal and his legacy being in the shadow, in the dark. The sentences written 
on the back cover of the books seem to reinforce such a feeling of being lost. “An 
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Istanbul evening which swallows up all the shadows. [...] Shadows are speaking in the 
dark.” (Livaneli Back Cover) To sum up, there is no need to highlight one again that 
paranoid mechanisms are at work in the articulation of these covers and titles and it 
seems to me that popular culture might be trying to utilize the already existing feeling 
of paranoid tendencies to attract more popular attention. 
 
3.2. How Did Islamist Erol Go Crazy? 
 
Often, more than more than one mechanism seems to be at work in paranoid thinking. 
As popular culture by definition is aiming at the taste of general thus average populi, it 
would be expected from the works of this culture to reflect the workings of these 
mechanisms explicitly since, with their desire to reach the majority, these works look 
for immediate attention and results. Therefore, analyses of such works of popular 
culture may give us hints as to which aspects of the psyche these and subtler works of 
literature are working on and which symptoms of the paranoid style they might display 
for further study. One such work of popular culture that has no intention of hiding its 
symptomatic aggression towards political Islam is How Did Islamist Erol Go Crazy? by 
Nihat Genç, who once wrote in the preface of a book The Man (Adam), which lists the 
names
46
 of men “[...] on whose shoulders Turkey stands, whose colons are being 
daggered by the pickaxes of the counterrevolution so that it would collapse [...]” (Özdil 
Back Cover) that  
As long as we are are alive, we are on the watch on those mountains where 
the enemy was savaged. We still have an arsenal as big as Anatolia on 
those mountains where we savaged the enemy. That arsenal is law, 
republic, citizenship and laicite. We are still pushing the enemy back on 
those mountains. We are fighting by shielding our chests made of bronze, 
not by cooperating insidiously under the counter with the [Islamic] 
communities and their wild imams.[...] (Genç in Özdil 8) 
At the very first sight, one can understand why Nihat Genç by establishing a splitting 
right away between “we” and “enemy”, by assigning himself as a rightful savior and 
                                               
46
 It is noteworthy to mention that the names that are mentioned in the book make up an Atatürk portrait on the cover 
of the book, further implying that these men “on whose shoulders Turkey stands” are actually the ones that Kemalists 
approve of and that somehow sustain/constitute Kemalist ideology.  
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defender of the republic, by pointing out laicite as one of the backbones of his ideology 
is an almost perfect Kemalist in his stance. Therefore, with numerous prints of his many 
literary books, Genç seems like a suitable sample of analysis for this thesis.  
I doubt if we can find a Kemalist book in which splitting does not dominate the 
style/discourse in question.  How Did Islamist Erol Go Crazy? is not an exception when 
it comes to establishing such a dichotomous psyche through the style it uses. The “bad” 
other that this book establishes is “Islamists” as the cover of the book immediately 
makes clear. In the case of this book we have Erol, the narrator, and Aysun, for me the 
real main character of the book, at one side of the dichotomy that have all the positive 
traits and on the other side, we have the generic Islamist characters.  
Every Islamist has already transformed into cold-blooded psychopaths. 
[...] Every Islamist has transformed into suicide bombers. [...] Many young 
men who consider it to be their rights to tear heads and sell their religion 
and countries. Yesterday, he was sitting at my book store; we were 
drinking tea together. He could not keep his head straight due to his 
diffidence but now, I  have seen his video, he does not seem diffident 
while beheading a fifteen-year-old. (Genç, 36)  
Just like we have seen in Nutuk, we face a “bad other” or a group of others that have 
transformed into people who are capable of hideous acts against the country; who have 
lost their morals and become psychopaths. We can actually see how the mechanism of 
splitting is explicitly at work and sense the subtle narcissism that is attributed to the 
self. At one point in time, the self and the other were at the same level of maturity and 
morality (“drinking tea together”) however, while the self has remained as sane, 
country-loving and clean as before despite and vis-à-vis Islamists who have become 
“psychopaths” and are able to sell their “country”. Therefore, the worse the other is, the 
better the self gets and is considered, according to this equation. Throughout the book, 
we see a lot of instances where Genç tries to emphasize how “bad” the other is. As a 
matter of fact, the books can be seen as one long zeal of humiliation of the Islamists, 
thus, that of dignification of people sharing Kemalist values such as laicite, women not 
wearing headscarves, pushing religion into the private sphere. In the book, we hear the 
words of humiliation mostly from the character of Aysun, who “is a sparkling a pure 
thing flowing like water; so light that maybe [Erol] thinks Islamism would not instill in 
her...” (Genç 60) and who in a sense represents a Kemalist woman with her traits 
attributed to her by Islamists such as “not covered, impudent, hanging out with men” 
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(Genç 97). Concerning the Islamists she utters sentences such as “[i]t is unnecessary for 
them even to die.”, “The desperation of powerlessness and helplessness dragged them 
into immorality.”, “None of these are men, they are ferocious rats.”,  “ the doors of their 
hearts and minds are opened only when they eat.” (Genç, 69-74). Within the range of 
five pages of the book, this is what Genç makes his character say about the Islamists 
with obvious words of humiliation. As mentioned above, the book has thousands more 
of these words so much so that the real challenge would be finding ones that do not 
humiliate the other. Of course, quoting every one of these words would be an 
impossible labor in the context of this thesis but even the random samples taken from 
the book reveal one characteristic of the book and its style; its aggressiveness. “The old 
friends; Islamists… whose brains and tongues are full of empty sectarian contestations, 
snot faces, shabby, pitiful, lazy wooden logs that would put out the fire they are thrown 
into, with their skins full of phlegm.” (Genç 122). We can confidently claim at this 
point where we have already talked about Klein, Freud and Kernberg that such 
aggressiveness or hatred leads to the humiliation/narcissism, splitting and other defense 
mechanisms that lead to/intensify paranoid thinking and style.  
The aggressiveness in question is self-revealing in the book with its emphasis on the 
stillness, motionless of the other. For instance, at one point of the book, Erol, the main 
character of the book, asks Aysun why she considers Islamists as “ferocious rats” and 
the answer is a rather thorough one.  
[W]hy are these people so nervous when there is no reason; a human being 
cannot sit for six hours without speaking. These people do! If they were to 
sit to lay eggs, they would stand up in three weeks; they will not even 
breathe in case it is considered as a sin; there is no looking right or left; 
there is no organizing the books and the astray lying awry before them; 
they constantly utter words in tension; they are neither cold nor warm; a 
human being may once speak in haste and may walk in  the street in a 
hurry [but] there is none of these in the, why do these people speak like 
chickens that escaped knives cutting their head [...] They assume slow 
death to be life. (Genç 71-72)  
Aysun’s thus Genç’ view on Islamists is clear. Their slowness, idleness is a trait to be 
angry at. The fast pace resulting from the lack of full stops and sentences flowing after 
one another together with the use of exclamation mark reinforce the case that the 
motionless state of Islamists -at least the way Kemalists see them- triggers the already 
existing aggressiveness and make them angry.  We can even talk about the feeling of 
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“envy” in a sense that that state of calmness that Kemalists attribute to Islamists is 
feeling that Kemalists strive to be in. The constant questioning of the reason as to why 
Islamists are so motionless may hint us the fact that Kemalists are actually looking for 
ways to be as calm and free of aggressiveness as their others. Therefore, we can get a 
hint of an inner conflict within Kemalists in that sense.  What is interesting in the 
aforementioned quotation is that the answer Aysun provides in that instance is not at all 
an answer to the question as to why she thinks Islamists are ferocious rats since the 
picture regarding Islamists she draws is not one of a ferocious thus a restless being but 
instead, one of a motionless one. This paradoxical answer may also give us clues about 
the conflicts Kemalists may be in. It is as if they are actually answering their own 
unspoken/unasked questions about their aggressiveness and how to get rid of it.  
In addition, one can also claim, again in line with Klein and Kernberg, that Kemalists 
are projecting their own state of being “nervous” and “in tension” and project it onto the 
“bad” other so that they can provide a defense mechanism against the laden 
aggressiveness and envy extant in them. This may also explain the frequent application 
of the words of humiliation by Kemalists since again for Kernberg, “to humiliate in 
order to avoid envy” (Kernberg Sınır 208) is a defense mechanism used against 
narcissism, which as we know from Freud, may lead to paranoid feelings. How Did 
Islamist Erol Go Crazy? is a great example in that sense to supply us instances to 
demonstrate how such mechanisms of “humiliation” and “aggression” induced by 
desired calmness are at work. “An evil silence” (Genç 96) the writer of the story 
describes the motionlessness at another instance. This definition alone may support the 
idea that envy and aggression may lead to a paranoid thinking in the sense that silence 
of Islamists is now regarded as “evil”.  
 
3.2.1. Losing Power and Bureaucracy 
 
There is another point in the book where the author criticizes the lack of aggression in 
Islamists and humiliates them, which is also noteworthy.   
Religious language has tied hands of these people. Bury yourself, your 
humanity with flamboyant words of your divinity; forget about them. On 
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these lands everyone’s rage, personality, reflexes, objections have been 
captured and captivated by these substituted bright sacred words. [...] Do 
we become “religious” so that our sense and sensation organs are 
deracinated?  (Genç 101) 
It is important to note that this time, Genç refer to the lack of aggressiveness in 
Islamists and claims that Islamic side of their political view retains Islamists from their 
humane traits as “rage, personality, reflexes, objections”. What is more important 
psychoanalytically and in the context of this thesis is the sentences Genç utters in his 
novel regarding the relationship between the aggressive language and 
homeland/motherland. “ A country cannot be a homeland/motherland and cannot be 
free unless the screams of [...] ‘fuck your guns and freedom’ are heard.” (Genç 102). 
What strikes me the most in these cases is the quick and the unexplained transition from 
cursing to becoming free and turning a country into a homeland. Somehow, Genç 
associates “cursing”, an aggressive oral act with formation of a motherland/homeland. 
This unexpected and ostensibly irrelevant linking, just like a revealing slip of tongue, 
seems to foreshadow another connection between the aggression/paranoia and the 
state/country/homeland, which is the loss of power and bureaucracy to political Islam. 
Different from Mustafa Kemal’s era, when Mustafa Kemal had the absolute power and 
had the bureaucratic control in his hand, Kemalists of the late 20
th
 and especially early 
21
st
 century, after losing power and later bureaucratic positions in the state AKP
47
, 
seems to have intensified the hatred/aggression thus paranoia/paranoid style and even 
manifested that intensification through the language and lexicon they used. Genç writes: 
[Erol] is watching without showing his true colors the days of power of his 
friends, their adventures of ministry, undersecretariat and consultancy; 
which position have they captured again, how many people have they fired 
and which ministry they have appointed thousands of their men to, 
millions of dollars, captured newspapers and TVs, their dreams have come 
true. (Genç 138) 
These are the lines that Erol himself utters, who is depicted as “a modest Muslim [...] 
not one of [those] ideological hormonal wild Muslims.” (Genç 139). Clearly, just like 
Mustafa Kemal, Genç is okay if Islam is not brought to the political domain but only 
lived in the private sphere as in Erol’s case. It is again a clear manifestation of the well-
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 Of course it was not the first time an Islamist party was taking control of the political power in Turkey.  After all, 
we have the example of Necmettin Erbakan as an important figure. However, while he or other Islamists were on 
power, bureaucratic institutions of the state were mostly still Kemalist or at least had Kemalist language.  
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known Kemalist trait which is defining and setting up restrictions on how religion can 
be lived within the society. That being said, we can see from the quotation above how 
much aware and disturbed Kemalists are by the “capturing” of the state by the Islamists. 
For them, it is as if  Islamists “capture” something that do not belong to them; they are 
firing -clearly- those who are not their “men” -possibly Kemalists- and placing their 
own
48. For them, Islamists are “a flock of hyenas [who] enjoy a carcass as big as the 
land of Anatolia and as the state. (Genç 138). Such a pejorative, humiliating and 
aggressive language against Islamist “enjoying the state” and the lands thus even the 
mother -motherland- in an Oedipal sense is noteworthy since it shows how intensely 
Kemalists are reacting against the resurgence and in this case losing power and more 
importantly, the bureaucratic state, which is an often recurring image and a reference 
given in How Did Islamist Erol Go Crazy? and recent Kemalist literature in general. 
This recurrent image of the loss of bureaucracy bears an utmost importance for the 
intensification of the paranoid style because bureaucratic organizations are, by some 
psychoanalysts like Kernberg, seen as a way of defense mechanism in the sense that 
establishing bureaucratic organizations actually help disperse the 
“envy/hatred/aggression”. “I refer specifically to bureaucratization of the relationships 
within the large group. This avoids regression into either narcissistic or paranoid 
structures, with the corresponding development of narcissistic or paranoid ideologies.” 
(Kernberg Even Paranoids 92-93). What Kernberg puts forward here has pivotal 
importance in terms of Kemalism and other groups/ideologies that show paranoid 
tendencies and styles in use. In order not to go back to what Klein referred to as 
“paranoid-schizoid stage” where envy and hatred are not processed and leads to 
narcissistic and paranoid traits, the groups form bureaucratic organizations, which in 
turn lead to narcissistic and paranoid ideologies, like Kemalism, which is the main 
assertion of this thesis. If what Kernberg claims has truth in it, then in the time of an 
Islamist party ruling the country and the loss of such bureaucratic structure, we would 
perceive of a regression into narcissistic and paranoid feelings by Kemalists, which 
seems to be the case analyzing Kemalist literature. As we have seen above, often Genç 
expresses his distress of losing such power and bureaucratic structure explicitly, 
attacking with fury and humiliation, further reinforcing Kernberg's claim. At one point, 
Genç shows such aggressive language with a reference to Islamists gaining power: 
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 We will come to this “paranoid” image of Islamists populating/capturing places and positions later in this chapter.  
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“Minute-by-minute, [Erol] has witnessed Islamists becoming beasts after they had 
obtained the [political] power.” (Genç 36). At another point, Islamists gaining political 
power is not mentioned but is an accepted presupposition. “[...] They have turned the 
land reclaimed by a sacred independence war into filthy lands [...]” (Genç 20). At 
others, Genç directly talks about the positions of the state that have been gained by 
Islamists, like he did in the quotation above when he mentioned the “ministries, 
undersecretariat and consultancies”.  
[Islamists] eradicated law with baseless evidences [...]. It is the era in 
which they took every risk in order to challenge the most entrenched 
institutions.  They have everything: TRT
49, TOKİ50, RTÜK51, law 
institutions, universities, TMSF
52
, the budget, and they see red so much as 
not to conduct a statutory audit for any of them. (Genç 77)   
This quotation is crucial in showing how Kemalists perceive the gaining of political 
power/bureaucracy by Islamists. By taking of hold the institutions, they have 
“everything”, which is an indicator of the fact that bureaucracy is of utmost importance 
for Kemalists politically and psychologically- as a defense mechanism of their 
aggression/hatred/envy.  Also, the fact that Islamists are “challenging the most 
entrenched institutions” indicated both a paranoid perception of Kemalists 
institutions/Kemalism being challenged and the fact that Kemalism and its institutions 
are the only ones that are rooted and should be kept. Again, a slight indication of 
narcissism is made present as a way of defending oneself when aggression/hatred/envy 
inducing subject is at hand.   
There are many other cases where Genç talks about Islamists becoming the “ministers 
of the most cruel thieves and agents of history” (Genç 55) or them “being placed into 
jobs within the state.” (Genç 74).  These frequent cases in which a pejorative language 
is used show how much Genç -and Kemalists in general- are going back to the early 
stages of envy/hatred against Islamism/political Islam and how much struggle they are 
having with losing one of their way of coping with  that much hatred -bureaucracy. As 
we have seen in the second chapter, Genç and -as we shall see later in thesis- recent 
Kemalist tradition share a similar attitude in putting the blame on political Islam for 
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 Housing Development Administration of Turkey  
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 The Supreme Board of Radio and Television 
52
 Saving Deposit Insurance Fund  
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following their personal interest before the motherland/the country/the republic and 
even exploiting those; splitting-induced dichotomous language, narcissistic fixation an 
so on. What is different in such a style from the early Kemalist era -which held the 
political power and formed a strong bureaucracy of its own throughout the year- is the 
intensity of the pejorative lexicon that is used and the frequency of the references made 
to the “other” in question-political Islam.  Following Kernberg -in the quest to find 
grounds for such intensification-, we could easily claim that the loss of the bureaucratic 
organizations within the state must have played an important role in such a revision in 
language. Of course, language is an organic being that adapts to time and space and one 
can rightfully claim that such a revision in language is the result of the organic change 
in the use of language itself that tries to adapt to modern language which is in general 
an aggressive one, even the political and the literary language. However, relating the 
change in language to the era it is used in this case would not explain the increasing 
frequency and the quantity of the use of such a pejorative language. Ergo, the 
observation claiming that losing bureaucracy -a defense mechanism against envy- might 
have played a big role in such a revision in language and lexicon.    
Besides the language, one can also object to the thesis of this study by claiming that 
such a paranoid style would not have to be necessarily and essentially a Kemalist 
reaction. Of course, we cannot expect from every Kemalist to see every happening 
through ideological lenses. Therefore, claiming such a reaction is a Kemalist one just 
because Nihat Genç is a Kemalist would not suffice. Luckily for researchers, Genç 
makes his claims in such an evident way that we know that his reaction against the 
resurgence of political Islam is a Kemalist one as well, thanks to his many readings on 
and through Kemalism. Genç makes Aysun speak most of the time: 
[For them] Atatürk did not kill the enemy but the Muslims. While they are 
calling Atatürk anti-christ, they smirk as if they were playing Hacivat-
Karagoz, they feel very free, ease off and get relaxed only when they are 
cursing Atatürk. Cursing Atatürk is a turning point for the unemployed, 
they become an important person when they curse Atatürk. (Genç 74-75) 
In this and many other instances, Kemalists see themselves in Islamists’ shoes and 
speak for Islamists for them. Thanks to instances like this, we understand how 
Kemalists think Islamists see Kemalists and we can get an insight of the reason why 
Kemalists develop a paranoid thinking against the Islamists on a manifest level. “[For 
them, Atatürk did not save Turkey but occupied it. They are like a rabbit that saw a 
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headlight when they see an Atatürk portrait.” (Genç, 73) and “[for them] God created 
the world for the sake of those in our bookshop. However, laymen took this world from 
them by force and persecution.” (Genç 76). 
In such instances, we do not even have to refer to psychoanalysis to decipher and 
uncover the latent content. We understand, for instance, from the quotation above, that 
Kemalists think that Islamists regard Atatürk as an “antichrist” figure and that Islamists 
claim that Atatürk killed the Muslims. When Kemalists put themselves in the shoes of 
the Kemalists in this way in which in they think Islamists do not like Atatürk, their 
paranoid thinking and the symptoms as well as the reference to defense mechanisms 
intensify. After all, at this point, we know that such hatred they think Islamists have 
against Atatürk may be mostly from the hatred/envy they project onto them. Therefore, 
we can claim that they must have had to feel the intensification of the envy/hatred so 
Kemalists felt the need to apply to the “projection” of the intensified hatred, which 
helps them reduce it. Besides, as we have seen that Islamists are seen as the other with 
whom they compete for the motherland/country/republic/power- (mother-milk), we can 
also refer to Freud and provide us a formula of the workings of such a projection, 
deepening paranoid thinking and style. The mechanism of symptom- building in 
paranoia requires that inner perception or feeling must be replaced by external 
perception. Then, “the proposition I hate him is projected in the form, He hates 
(persecutes) me, which justifies me in hating him.” (Freud Complete 63) We see 
instances in the book which makes clear the paranoid expectations from Islamists and 
regard them as vengeful. For example, in of those instances, Genç regards the Islamist 
generation as “[a] generation who do not accept any status of those who are outside and 
who nurture grudges with vengeful feelings.” (Genç 85). It is no-brainer that Kemalists 
develop a paranoid thinking and in return a style against Islamists when they see 
Islamists “who nurture grudges with vengeful feelings.”. For Kemalists, Islamists went 
through a phase in which “the remark ‘The parenthesis of the republic is closed’ is 
linked to statement ‘The old Turkey is abolished and the New Turkey has been 
founded’[...].” (Genç 78) 
3.3. Entomo-language, Claustrophobia and Darkness 
Another distinctive aspect of the paranoid style we put to use in Kemalist literature is 
the language and images associating political Islam with an insect-related lexicon, a 
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feature which I relate to paranoia itself. One of the most encountered images in paranoia 
is the image of “shadows” and so far, without analyzing them,  we have seen some 
examples such images in Kemalist literature. For instance, we have seen the image of 
“dark men” utilized at the beginning of this study and we have encountered sentences 
like “[s]hadows are speaking in the dark” on the back cover of Zülfü Livaneli’s book, 
Shadows. “Dark and shadowy” images in mind, the presence of another image and 
related language -for me- stood out among others; which was the insect-related and 
similar images and language. Up until now, we have seen the reminiscents of such 
images in both Mustafa Kemal’s and Nihat Genç’ discourse. Remember Mustafa Kemal 
called Vahdettin a “low creature” and Nihat Genç’s character Aysun insisted that 
Islamists were “ferocious rats”, an image encountered in “Delusional Infestation” which 
is a psychological disorder understood by “fixed belief of being infested with pathogens 
against all medical evidence.” (Freudenmann and Lepping 692). Of course, it would be 
far-fetched and daring to claim that  Kemalists are suffering from such a specific 
disorder with almost no scientific data but the fact that insects-like delusions have been 
present in the history of paranoia-related cases may warn us to look out for such 
images. Therefore, it would be best to hunt for and analyze such images in paranoid 
style of Kemalists together with other dark and shadowy images.   
“Why [...] did the insects start to move and attacked the world as if a volcano had 
erupted?” (Genç 78) asks Genç while explicitly referring to the Islamists as insects 
rising up and attacking the world. At this explicit level of the language, we do not see 
the explanation of the metaphor of “insect” in any way. Here, in this instance for 
example, “insect” is just used as a word of humiliation but it is crucial to note that this 
metaphor implies something both bigger and more latent in terms of the style and the 
psyche of Kemalism since reading the parts of this texts and some other texts included 
in this study with the image of “insect” in mind, it is possible to see that Genç is 
drawing a claustrophobic picture and using a claustrophobic  and insect-related 
language that can be called entomo-language in which Kemalism or Kemalist images 
are surrounded and outnumbered-generally- by “dark” Islamists, as if Islamists were as 
Genç would say “insects”.  
[Erol] would say “he is a boy who would eat a carcass of a dog 
with pleasure”. “He would not hesitate [to] eat if put a fried mouse 
before.”. It can be disgusting for humans but a parasite lives in a 
44 
 
carcass animately, many cestodes are living inside the growing 
crowds. (Genç 107) 
This quotation forms the association between the “incest-like/parasite-like” Islamists 
together with they being forming and being parts of the “crowds”. This association is 
important to notice since not every writer may not be able to use the insect-like 
metaphors so explicitly as Genç does and/or may not choose to do so. Also, I believe 
what leads to a paranoid/delusional idea of insects populating Turkey may also the 
product of a bigger feeling like being outnumbered/feeling claustrophobic. Therefore, 
looking for images to see if Kemalist language/style/discourse is claustrophobic is 
important if one wants to see how much Kemalist style is paranoid if it is paranoid after 
all. Besides providing us many examples of entomo-language directly or connotatively 
as in cases when he says“[t]hey are fond of eating a lot; that is why they are impossible 
‘to annihilate’.”(Genç 76) as if they were a growing/evolving type of insects that are 
impossible to get rid of, Genç refers to the related image of Islamists populating, 
wandering around, “growing”  in a paranoid discourse many instances in his book, like 
many other Kemalists we will analyze. At one point, he describes  “desperate hopeless 
without a future [...] they are coming in and out of the shop in a vague manner like 
stretching and shortening mid-afternoon shadows that are like patterns drawn on a dusty 
floor. (Genç 56).” Once again, Genç leaves us with some uncertain shadowy images, 
drawing Islamists like aimless beings wandering around. Even though we do not see a 
certain image of surrounding crowds at this exact instance, reading this passage arouse 
a feeling of claustrophobia in the chapter it is used where Genç narrates how Islamists 
came to populate a district in Ankara, Hacıbayram a place which “was given to the 
plunder of Islamist institutions and foundations.” (Genç 57). A couple of sentences later 
after Genç describes the transformation of Hacıbayram that has “a greatly crowded stop 
(mahşeri kalabalık)”, he elucidates on the feeling of claustrophobia he feels. “We are at 
the beginning of the 1990s
53
, the air has started to darken due to coal fumes, it is not 
possible to breathe, not a single step can be taken in the stampede [...].” (Genç 57). 
Obviously, the sense of not being able to breathe in the crowded dark streets filled with 
Islamists give the reader a sense of claustrophobia together with the general atmosphere 
of this chapter and the book in general. Later in the book, Genç also links a similar 
feeling to not political Islam but religion/Islam in general, hinting us at another style of 
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the Kemalist style which the confusion they produce in meronomy related to political 
Islam, by which I mean the following. While they are attacking political Islam, they 
also tend to attack Islam/religion and Islamic imagery alone due to its relationship to 
political Islam and due to it being a part of the concept of political Islam. In other 
words, I claim that intentionally or unintentionally, Kemalists tend to attack the straw 
man, meaning that they attack Islam and Islamic imagery while they are fighting with 
political Islam, which causes the scope of paranoid thinking to be widened and 
deepened with new image possibilities. In other words, a transference is done again 
either knowingly or unknowingly, in which “bad” qualities/images of the political Islam 
are transferred to Islam alone. 
Religion was everywhere on these creatures. Religion is in/on their collars 
religion is in the way they sit like slaves religion is in their speeches to 
children religion is in pontification religion is in Denmark religion is in/on 
their mustaches religion is in the sacrifices of their suicide bombers 
religion is in their mouths religion is on/in their feet religion is in the skins 
of their sacrificial animals religion is in deserts religion is in poems 
religion is in cinemas religion is in tear drops religion is in the civilization, 
there is a religion patrolling without its ropes. (Genç 105) 
 As the quotation makes it clear, we see the image of “religion” that is propagating and 
leaving no place without it similar to that of a virus/insects. We should note that even if 
Genç does not clearly draw the insect/virus metaphor here, the undertone and the 
language has a similar style and feeling with that of a “cestodes growing crowds”. In 
addition, this language resounds bits and pieces of the one mentioned above where 
Genç described the scene as “impossible to breathe.”. Last not least, the anxious non-
stop tempo that ignores punctuations like simple commas makes the reader feel the 
uneasiness of the writer towards Islamists. 
Of course, for one to be able to attribute such styles of the language to the style 
Kemalism adopts in general, one should see the instances in other Kemalist texts, as 
well and that is what this study recognized to be the case. Similar claustrophobic and 
paranoid feeling of being surrounded and outnumbered is encountered in other texts of 
(popular) culture. An ambitious, self-proclaimed Kemalist, who has been described as 
someone who“ has both seen the  fraternity and treachery [...]” and who “called the 
dictator a dictator [and] never bent down.” (Özdil  469), Levent Kırca is a theatre and 
TV actor, who produced a very famous TV show called Olacak O Kadar (Will It Up). 
According to the official channel of the programme on YouTube, the show “is a satiric 
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TV programme that continued on various Turkish TV programmes for 22 years and that 
talks about the issues of the people.” (Olacak O Kadar 2014). Expectedly from a critical 
TV show as this one, Levent Kırca utilized the sketches he created in the program to 
convey his ideology from time to time and used a language, which I believe to be very 
similar to that of Genç’s and many other Kemalists, helping contribute to forming a 
shared language which shows paranoid characteristics that we have talked about above.  
One of these TV sketches called “Documentary - Atatürk (Belgesel - Atatürk) is 
particularly intriguing to analyze in terms of its quality to manifest both Kırca’s and 
Kemalism’s way of looking at and drawing political Islam.  The video clip starts with 
an overall description of “1900’s”, a period which is depicted in a rather miserable, 
hopeless sense with deserted landscapes. However, as a few frames later, a group of 
people with explicit and rather exaggerated Islamic imagery show up in the video, with 
men having a long beard and wearing Islamic “imamah”, a hat that Imams wear and 
with women, all of whom are wearing black niqabs (Figure 8). At this very scene, the 
group of people and the homeland are both transparent and visible as if the homeland 
and the people were intermingled with one another or these people were the “ghosts” 
living in the land. All of these people look extremely angry gazing at the camera, the 
audience. At this “ghosty” scene, again, we can refer to the theory of projection and 
claim that Islamists are projected onto a feeling, an image. It is the aggression/hatred 
Kemalists projects onto Islamists. At this point, one can rightfully ask if there is any 
Kemalist text in which Islamists are depicted as peaceful, harmless human beings. 
Almost all the time, they are depicted in Kemalist texts as angry, foxy, hating people. 
As we will see later in the study, they are drawn as arrogant or a certain arrogance is 
implied even when they are drawn smiling and happy.  
Later in the sketch, we are introduced a woman who is dressed in a western garment, 
walking past the aforementioned group in Islamic imagery (Figure 9). At that moment, 
we hear the voice-over saying “these people do not show tolerance against people who 
do not dress and behave like them”. and the males of the group start looking and 
pointing at the woman, implying condemnation. A few seconds later, they start 
following the woman. Immediately after this scene, something strange happens and the 
linear narration is disturbed. The story is cut there and we see the group once again, 
together in front of an all back background and floor. This deviation from the linear 
storytelling this strange switch back to the group is worth noting since it is in this scene, 
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too, we encounter a claustrophobic feeling. In this scene, the group moves aimlessly, 
from left to right and right to left (Figure 10). Even when some of them leaves the 
scene, the crowded scene starts again. In Kırca’s mind, what are these people doing 
since this is not a natural follow-up scene at all? Or in his mind who are these people 
really? Are they thinking about their next conspiracy? Does he see these people as 
aimless people who wander around like “insects” with their embedded black/dark 
imagery? The scene that follows this artificial one slowly moves onto the men whom 
we had seen that started the follow the Western woman. At that point, the voice-over 
talks about “fear” as if it was trying to prove that this group, these “aimless” beings are 
up to no good. Referring to the people who are against Islamists, it says “they are right 
to be afraid because these bearded and [dark clothed] people are extremely 
fearly/unrestrained”. With these remarks, we see four men from the group walking 
towards the camera, the audience and the woman at the same time, evoking the image 
and the feeling of “closedness” further. This feeling of claustrophobia is almost taken to 
the extreme when the men start lynching the woman from every direction (Figure 11), 
leaving no space to escape or as Genç would say to “breathe”.  Of course, what is being 
lynched at that scene is Kemalism as well in the symbolic sense of the word since the 
woman with her Western imagery corresponds to the famous image “modern 
Kemalist/Western woman” of the republic. Obviously, Kırca makes an anachronistic 
mistake by relocating a modern concern, which is the Kemalist woman image against 
old-fashioned/Islamic imagery, because such antagonism belonged to post-republic era, 
heating up during the 1990s and on, not exactly to the pre-republic era of the 1900s. 
The comments voice-over makes further reinforces the idea that this sketch is a 
contemporary critique of Islamism with Kemalist spectacles with the references it 
makes to the loss of power/bureaucracy that we so far have talked about. “Behind them 
were those who ruled the country [backing them up].”. Here we see a similar approach 
to Islamists in the sense that they are being backed up by those who are in charge. We 
remember a similar attitude by Genç who claimed that people were constantly given 
jobs in the state, referring to the modern bureaucratization in the state. Of course, 
Islamists being supported by the political power is a recent issue just like the image of 
women presented a few frames ago. From all these implications, we can read the sketch 
as a modern critique and response of Kemalists against the re-rise of political Islam. In 
fact, this claim makes sense when we consider and compare the two different languages 
used against political Islam by Mustafa Kemal and contemporary Kemalists. Whilst 
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Mustafa Kemal put a lot of weight on treachery, he did not suffer from a claustrophobic 
feeling or he did not refer to a certain nepotism in bureaucracy as Genç and other 
Kemalists have done recently. As we have seen above, this language belongs to a 
contemporary Kemalists. Considering this difference in language, we can claim, again, 
that the sketch at hand is a modern critique and response of Kemalists against the 
resurgence of political Islam and it talks about mostly the psyche and feelings 
(aggression/envy and so on) of modern Kemalists. With all these modern referential 
symbolism
54
 at hand, we would not be wrong to claim that like Genç, Kırca, too, suffers 
from a certain feeling of aggression and envy together with claustrophobia caused by 
Islamists, leading to further deepening of the paranoid thinking and style. Such paranoia 
and paranoid style reveal itself once again at the end of the video with the following 
words, with a repetitive emphasis on the word “my father (atam)”. 
They say the time erases everything; it is a lie my father!/ Today’s logning 
is worse than yesterday, my father./ My father, who so to say is living in 
my heart rather than the soil./ Today, the grand homeland/motherland is 
still crying, my father!/ You rest in peace; no one is strong enough to bring 
our country back to those old days, my father! (Olacak O Kadar) 
The paranoia of another group taking over the “homeland/motherland” is and trying to 
bring the country back to pre-republic era is self-evident in these scenes, just like in 
Genç and even in the placards from the Introduction. Similarities in these instances are 
almost identical as one can easily notice the defensive lexicon here, the emphasis on the 
urge to “defend” the republic. It is as if Kırca and other Kemalists are answering to 
“Address to Youth”, to Mustafa Kemal who wanted people to defend the country when 
necessary, which is, of course, almost always in the paranoid thinking. Indeed, so many 
similarities in language, in feelings, in psyches among many Kemalists cannot be 
accepted only as coincidences; that is why talking about a Kemalist aesthetics a 
paranoid one is better to be spoken and put into consideration for further studies bigger 
than this one.  
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Still, what matters is not the intention but the end product we are dealing with in this instance.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECTS OF PARANOID STYLE ON CULTURAL WORKS 
4.1. Paranoia in a painting? 
 
Now that we have talked about paranoia, the splitting in the psyche, narcissism, the 
claustrophobia and other certain images and feelings related to Kemalist style in 
popular culture, I would like now to go into a domain where works of culture are not 
directed to the taste of the majority of the population, by which I mean the culture 
consisting of works that mostly prioritize aesthetics and are not generally intended for 
the taste, understanding and access of general public. Having said so, my claim is going 
to be that due to the paranoid style Kemalists have adopted recently due to their position 
against the resurgence of political Islam, aesthetics of the works produced has been 
either overlooked or sacrificed completely. 
 The first work of art that I will try to analyze to illustrate my point is a painting by 
Bedri Baykam. This painting is crucial to be analyzed since it will show us how much 
Kemalist language with its paranoid tendencies is rooted in different types of artworks 
and how far the scope of the Kemalist canon stretches. The painting I am referring is 
one called Thank You, Turkey (Teşekk rler T rkiye) produced in 2007 by Bedri 
Baykam, who besides being an artist belongs to the popular culture with his many 
appearances on various TV programmes related to politics, football and so on. Bedri 
Baykam is another self-proclaimed Kemalist with his numerous books on the ideology 
called Kemali m’  Bridge  o  he New Cen ury (Kemalizm’in Yeni Y zyıla Köpr   ), 
Secular Turkey Without Concession (Ödünsüz Laik Türkiye), Mustafa Kemals, to the 
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Du y! (Mu  afa Kemaller  öre  Başına), His Eyes55 are Always on us (Gözleri Hep 
Üzerimizde). As one can clearly understand, we do not need further proofs to 
demonstrate the self-proclaimed Kemalist identity of Bedri Baykam and start the 
analysis of the style used in the painting. According to Bedri Baykam, this is a “3D 
work”, in which there is “Atatürk and around him [there are] Gül, Erdoğan, their wives 
and around them, women from every age that are turbaned and covered. [...] I wondered 
why thousands of people who came to my exhibition were infatuated with this 
painting.” (Baykam 2007). Indeed, Baykam reduces the imagery he used in the painting 
down to turbaned women and rightfully wonders why this painting struck a lot of 
people. I believe there is more in this painting telling us a lot about the Kemalist 
paranoid style, which might have had a lot to do with the appreciated reception it 
received from the visitors. The way I see it, this painting has almost every quality of a 
proper Kemalist paranoid style and in that way, akin to its purely textual companions 
that we have analyzed above which belong to popular culture. The famous paranoid 
idea which is losing or having already lost the republic/motherland/bureaucracy is 
visible at first sight in the painting. If this painting is to represent the overall state of 
Turkey, then, of course, at the very heart/core of the painting, we have a huge Atatürk 
portrait, which is contrasted with every other image surrounding it -except for another 
silhouette of Mustafa Kemal’s on the bottom right. Even though we have the portrait of 
Atatürk in the middle, he is surrounded by many Islamic/Islamist images of a lot of 
turbaned women with niqabs and so on. Clearly, Baykam still think that 
Atatürk/Kemalism has not not completely been erased from Turkish context however, 
the fact that Mustafa Kemal says “Thank you, Turkey”, which is written on his portrait 
and voiced orally, arouses the idea that Mustafa Kemal, the father, is not happy at all 
with the current state of the republic that is lost to political Islam. Here, Mustafa Kemal 
is resurrected with his own image and voice to censure his children. His warnings in 
Address to Youth and Nutuk have been ignored and his image/the republic has been or is 
about to be lost to those surrounding him. Of course, this harsh critique, which gets 
stronger due to its indirect and sarcastic nature, evokes the paranoid feeling that 
something has been lost or is about to be lost unless something -more- is done, which 
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 We understand that “his eyes” refer to Mustafa Kemal’s eyes since the cover of the book is designed with Mustafa 
Kemal’s eyes. The title is also interesting in that it either consciously or unconsciously proves the idea that Mustafa 
Kemal always watches us (Somay Psychopolitics 148), which is a state of mind that would intensify the paranoid 
psyche. 
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leads to adhering to Kemalist ideology more, deepening of the paranoid thinking and 
the mechanisms causing it, split/dichotomous view on people and so on.  Such a style, 
such emotions evoked, I believe,  may also explain the “infatuation” Baykam talks 
about or why those people who visited the exhibition were “struck” by the painting so 
much.  
Others points that stood out among the others in terms of -paranoid- style are about the 
composition and details of the painting which in their essence has narcissistic features 
in a way and it is not only because the portrait of Atatürk is in the heart of the painting. 
The first detail to point at is the use of collage forming the composition. As one can see 
from the painting, all the details in the front are placed with the technique of collage, 
the style of cutting and sticking different images together. A quick research shows that 
the style bedri Baykam uses is not unique to this particular painting but the fact that he 
chose to use this particular technique in this particular painting is noteworthy in the 
sense that this style is completely in line with the splitting Kemalists refer to when they 
want to ease off  the hatred/aggression, which leads to narcissism thus paranoid in the 
psyche as we have discussed above in the second chapter. In this case, the technique of 
collage is one of the best options to be adopted since it helps express the splitting 
Kemalists do between themselves (Mustafa Kemal) and political Islam (Erdoğan, Gül, 
women wearing turbans). Again, Kemalists draw limits, boundaries between themselves 
and Islamists, between good and bad, implying they are not anything like those “bad” 
others. “Good” is a quality of theirs. Let us once again bring forth the claim here. “We 
see the explicit coldness and antipathy towards [the others] an indication of narcissism.” 
(Freud Kitle 53) 
In fact, this narcissistic point of view/psyche is carried so far in the painting is that 
Atatürk’s head is highlighted in a way that it immediately reminds one of the halo of 
divinity as one can see in Jesus portraits around Jesus’s head. While this halo-like 
contour separates Atatürk’s head from the corresponding images of turbaned women 
and niqabs and brings forward the image, it also dignifies and transcends it, introducing 
a prophet-like image. All in all, it would not wrong to claim that this “secular” prophet-
savior-like image is narcissistic with its contrast to political Islam and claim that such a 
narcissistic image is desired as “ego ideal” by a group of people. This outer love to a 
leader by the individuals may seem like a limitation of the narcissistic feelings of the 
individuals but within the groups “individuals feel as if they were homogenous beings” 
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and the narcissistic feeling is substituted by the “libidinal bonding with other 
individuals” (Freud Kitle 54) of the same group. This bonding is expected to be seen as 
stronger and more “determinant”56 when it is felt toward the leader of the group, who 
according to Freud “might pursue unconditional narcissism”57 himself. Such a theory of 
“homogeneity” might explain both why we often see a shared lexicon/style and even a 
shared psyche among Kemalists and why the leader of the ideology, Mustafa Kemal, 
can be so much glorified by the members of the group thanks to the libidinal bonding 
with the members and the leader of the group. This claim gains strengths when we put 
forward, like Taha Parla does, the idea that some people actually seem to find an “ego 
ideal in Atatürk” (Parla Kemalist 308 and Parla Kemalizm, Türk. 316)  
Besides this narcissistic  imagery that we often encounter in Kemalist texts, we can talk 
about other similarities of this painting with the texts we have and are going to analyze 
in this study such as claustrophobia and projection of aggression, both of which are 
linked to paranoid style of Kemalists. If we again go back to the structure that makes up 
the composition of the painting, we can see that even though Atatürk image is in front, 
we feel a sense of claustrophobia due to the fact that Atatürk portrait is surrounded by 
the Islamic/Islamist images. Of course, this sense of claustrophobia is lighter and more 
optimistic than the one drawn by Genç, in which it was “impossible to breathe” because 
in this painting, we at least have a way out from the feeling of claustrophobia. We are 
not surrounded by political Islam completely. On the bottom right, we have the white 
Atatürk silhouette which may imply that the way out from this inclosure is again 
Kemalism/Mustafa Kemal. The ideology and/or Mustafa Kemal is the remedy of the 
psychological -paranoid- state Kemalists are in for Baykam and other Kemalists, which, 
as far as this study is concerned, seems to be a paradox since it is Kemalism itself that 
adds to if not leads to such a paranoid (claustrophobic, narcissistic, split) feeling/state of 
mind in the first place as we have seen in the second chapter. In other words, whenever 
Kemalists call out Kemalism as a remedy to their paranoid psyche, they call out an 
inescapable paradox together with it.  
As for the aggression and its projection onto the other, even though the general tone of 
the painting is indirect or passive-aggressive (since Mustafa Kemal sarcastically thanks 
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Turkey), Bedri Baykam does not leave out to provide us another aggressive Islamist in 
the painting (on the top left), just like Nihat Genç does. The fact that this aggressive 
turbaned woman is in the painting again shows us the mindset of Kemalists. It is 
actually them who are trying to deal with aggression/hatred; that is why, they do not 
miss the chance to depict them aggressive whenever possible within their works. Such 
projection of one’s aggression onto the other has been among the recurrent features of 
the paranoid style of Kemalism so far as the works in this study are concerned. The 
main passive/indirect aggressive behavior of the painting may even be the result of this 
projection since due to such a projection, the intensity of the aggression may have been 
de-escalated, thus may have paved the way to be able to afford an indirect/passive 
aggressive behavior within the style instead of an anticipated direct/active aggressive 
one.  
 
4.2. Political Art or Artistic Politics? 
 
Indeed, that is not all about the style in question. There is another  characteristic to be 
pointed out that stands out among others, which is the overall transformation of the 
style Kemalists use producing their works, the result of which is the products similar to 
the ones produced within popular/populist in which aesthetics is a vague concern. An 
observable switch from prioritizing aesthetics towards politics or -realpolitik or 
everyday politics to be precise- has haunted all of the Kemalist works that have been 
analyzed above and are going to be analyzed later on. Of course, we know that for 
Kemalists, art and culture in general have been a field of propaganda for Kemalism. 
However, in the recent years when political Islam have gained power, the so called 
“works of art” say novels, stories, paintings and so on have concentrated so much more 
on the message they are delivering as if they were not writing literary pieces or 
producing works of art but party manifestos -and it is logical to associate this switch to 
the loss of bureaucracy and intensification of paranoid thinking. This is not at all to say 
that politics has no place in literary pieces or art in general; however, when politics 
becomes the end goal with explicit remarks on everyday politics, putting style, 
aesthetics in the second place, what is produced does not become a “political art” but an 
“artistic politics”.  Of course, the change in the content also affects the style that is 
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being used since literary language can only be used to some extent because “artistic 
politics” would very much like to reach as many people as possible; that is why, the 
language and the overall style should be accessible to the crowds, downgrading 
aesthetics of culture to the level of that of popular/general culture.  I come up with such 
an idea thanks to a metaphor proposed by Ortega y Gasset. He rightfully claims that 
when someone tries to look outside through a window and focuses on the garden s/he is 
looking at, s/he would not see the marks on the windows. However, he claims, when we 
switch our attention to see the window, the garden disappears and we see the marks on 
the window
58. “Similarly, a person who is expecting to get moved [...] by a word of art, 
adjusts his/her perception to it and as a result, cannot see the work of art.” (Ortega y 
Gasset 24). Following a similar logic of Ortega y Gasset’s, it is reasonable to say that 
when the writers prioritize the political message over the style and the aesthetics, they 
cannot see the artistic side of their work and in the end do not produce a work of  art but 
again, a manifesto -with a few artistic nuances if we are lucky. We have so many 
instances where aesthetics is not a matter of concern while the main purpose is to 
provide political information and do propaganda. Such populist methods are expected to 
be adopted by the artists of popular culture as they wish to be read by as many people as 
possible. We have seen many examples of these even in the few examples we provided 
in the first chapter. “[Islamists] eradicated law with baseless evidences[...].  They have 
everything: TRT, TOKİ, RTÜK, law institutions, universities, TMSF, the budget, and 
they see red so much as not to conduct a statutory audit for any of them.” (Genç 77) 
says Genç at one point in his book as we have seen above. Or at another, he writes 
“[h]owever, now that the boss is America [the USA], they work so much that no one 
can contend against [these] Islamists.” (Genç 79). If these sentences were not to be 
found within a book that classifies itself as “novel” on the cover, one, would without 
doubt, think they were from extremely stereotypical newspaper columns, crowd-seeking 
political rallies, judging from the very straightforward, simple, didactic and thesis-like 
sentences. It is not even necessary to remind and emphasize on the very explicit, 
speech-like nature of the images and the narration of the sketch we analyzed from 
Kırca, who, in this TV programme, never seemed to have an aesthetic but a comedic 
and sarcastic concern, which was also sacrificed for the sake of political message in this 
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particular case. However, aesthetics is rarely the primary concern in the works of 
popular culture and it is not surprising for these works to sacrifice aesthetics for the 
sake of politics. What is perplexing is to observe a similar trend and style in the works 
that do not necessarily belong to popular culture. The first of these works in which 
politics leaves aesthetics in its shade is the painting we have analyzed above by Bedri 
Baykam. Baykam has always been considered to be among one of the most 
internationally renowned Turkish painter by many people for whom, for instance, Le 
Figaro wrote: "He can draw with both hands equally skillfully, can pass from the 
figurative to the non-figurative, can make use of a brush, a pencil or a charcoal, and 
finally can enliven Matisse and Miro before our very eyes." ("EXCERPTS From 
CRITICS"). One can find many appreciative criticisms from many professors and 
critics from all over the world on this website, all of which seem to suggest that 
Baykam’s paintings have been well received and acclaimed. However, I claim, paranoia 
and prioritization of the paranoid politics have degraded the values of the works that 
have been produced within this framework. Let us once again turn to the painting whose 
paranoid features we have analyzed above, in which sense it shared a lot of similarities 
with the works of popular culture. In his painting called Teşekk rler T rkiye, we know 
that Bedri Baykam used a technique called collage. One can claim the adoption of this 
technique is aesthetically appropriate for a painting that wished to show (and deepen) 
the dichotomous nature of the political spectrum of the agents in the painting. However, 
a painting cannot be called aesthetic only because of its technique it chooses to utilize. 
After all, its choice of collage as a technique is not the first quality that the painting is 
praised for. The fact that Atatürk speaks in this painting and sarcastically thanks Turkey 
is made the primary purpose of the painting and the aesthetic components of the 
painting such as the choice of lively colors in the background, which does not suit the 
dark message and the paranoid nature of the painting anyway, the use of collage as a 
means representation do not come to the forefront, which already damages the 
aesthetics of the painting according to Ortega y Gasset. There are other problematics in 
the choice, I believe, that dis-serve the quality of the painting in aesthetic terms. Let us 
take the portrait of Atatürk used in the painting and the handwriting put in the middle of 
it that says “Teşekkürler Türkiye”. Here, the problem damaging the aesthetics of the 
painting arises from the following reasons. The first one I believe is the very existence 
of that handwriting. This explicit way of conveying the message is in all aspects a very 
amateur way of execution since it does not fit the style Baykam is using in this painting. 
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It is not a component of any artistic choice Baykam made say the college and the colors 
and so on. This writing is just floating there randomly with its conspicuity on the suit of 
Mustafa Kemal. Why does this message have to be given so explicitly? Why does this 
message have to be given at all? According to Baykam, the audience already hears the 
exact same words “Teşekkürler Türkiye” from Mustafa Kemal’s own voice59 already. 
Why would he repeat the same message making changes on the painting at the expense 
of aesthetics? Clearly, this writing is just there so Baykam makes sure that the sarcastic 
message is conveyed. It is not there for an artistic end whatsoever. In fact, its 
randomness, its explicitness, and its aimlessness prevent this painting from being a 
work of aesthetics and the reason for that is an anxious paranoid concern for the 
political message. When we compare such an anxious and paranoid reaction with that of 
a great writer, Bertolt Brecht, we can see who actually prioritizes what in their works of 
art. As Berna Moran endorses in his book, Brecht refused to make his character, Mother 
Courage, to openly speak about a communist thesis at the end of the play in order to 
avoid  any kind of misunderstanding about the message/effect Brecht was supposed to 
be after. Moran rightfully concludes that Brecht “must probably have thought that 
making a more explicit explanation, getting from implicitly would decrease the artistic 
value of the work.” (Moran 283-284). Therefore, just like Ortega Y Gasset, Brecht also 
thought that when aesthetics is not the main priority, it would have negative effects the 
aesthetics of a work of art, a result which we have seen in Baykam’s case.  
The second problem with the aesthetics of the painting that in fact conflicts with the 
sarcastic message it is trying to convey is the choice of the Atatürk portrait used in the 
painting. In this particular painting, Mustafa Kemal has one of his strong politician 
postures that is in line with his cult of personality that was created. He looks away -as 
politicians often do in their photos, with his head held high. Normally, in order for the 
sarcasm to work properly in this case, Baykam might as well have used a thoughtful or 
a worried image of Mustafa Kemal
60
, a state for which Atatürk would have a reason to 
thank Turkey sarcastically and the work would have the potential to have much deeper 
“effect”, which Baykam was after all along. Why would Atatürk thank Turkey 
“sarcastically” if he is still strong? In a state where Atatürk still has a powerful position, 
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57 
 
the sarcasm would not work, as there would be no reason to be disappointed or 
ungrateful -opposite of thankful, as the sarcasm suggests-. Here, I associate the choice 
such a strong portrait with the concern of somehow damaging strong Atatürk image, a 
concern which Kemalists have always been closely watchful of. Mustafa Kemal can 
almost never be shown as emotional, incorrect or defective for Kemalists. An extreme 
example of this is the law 5816, which is titled as “The Law On the Crimes Committed 
Against Atatürk”61. This particular law was enacted in 1951 to protect the legacy of 
Atatürk obviously and was from time to time exploited by being used not only against 
insults but also any negative remark uttered for Atatürk. Independently of this law, we 
have a recent example that illustrates the protective stance Kemalists take for the strong 
image of Mustafa Kemal. Many criticisms the docudrama on Mustafa Kemal called 
Mustafa are exemplary of how protective Kemalists can get on the issue. At the time the 
movie was released, it was criticised to show Mustafa Kemal too weak, too aggressive 
and too authoritative occasionally by Kemalists. A columnist and TV personality, 
Abbas Güçlü, wrote on the movie that “it did not give us the details we expected but 
different ones. One of the main reasons for the criticisms and the disappointments is 
this.” (Güçlü 2008). As one can clearly see, a different representation of Atatürk is even 
unimaginable and a reason for disappointment for Kemalists. For most of them, Atatürk 
needs to be re-told with the same -expected- details over again. They want to see what 
they have already seen and any diversion from that path is a reason to get 
alarmed/paranoid for Kemalists, as the criticisms and the painting of Baykam have 
shown above.  
Baykam is not the only person who has sacrificed his/her aesthetics for the sake of 
Kemalism due to paranoid thinking. Reading his poems for a couple of years, I 
observed a similar if not a greater shift in the poetry of Ataol Behramoğlu, as well, of 
course in a negative sense of the word. For many people, Ataol Behramoğlu is 
considered as a significant figure in Turkish literature thanks to his poems and his 
translations as well as anthologies he prepared and so on. Like we have seen at the end 
of the Introduction, Kemalists see him as a “grand poet”. Likewise, many other 
international critics and poets have highlighted the quality of his poems. “What we hear 
from Ataol Behramoğlu’s poems are the statements that are unfeigned, stated 
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generously and are passed on from person to person.” (Para in Behramoğlu 
Yaşadıklarımdan 200) says Jean Baptiste Para after stating that Ataol Behramoğlu is 
actually in line with Nâzım Hikmet’s poem tradition. Timour Muhidine says that “[t]he 
ones who read Ataol Behramoğlu’s poems [...] taste the whole pleasure of Turkish 
language.” (Mouhidine in Behramoğlu Yaşadıklarımdan 200). He has been awarded 
with many prizes and was even nominated to Nobel Prize for Literature in 2016 by 
Eminescu Academy. (Behramoğlu Ne Çok 5). Especially the comment from Mouhidine 
suggests that Behramoğlu’s poems have rhymes and rhythms together with poetic 
imagery and so on, features not enough alone to but necessary for poems to be regarded 
as “poems”. I put forwards that the recent poems produced by Behramoğlu have lost 
almost  every aspects of his poems worth prising for, if he had ever had any before. Of 
course, the paranoid discourse/thinking thus putting everyday-political messages before 
poetics and aesthetics seemed to have played an enormous role in the process. Let us 
take a poem of Behramoğlu’s titled Gezi62 Onurumuzdur to start illustrating our point. 
The poem reads as the following in Turkish
63
. 
Gezi onurumuzdur/ Gezi zalime, zulme karşı koyuşumuzdur/ Gezi 
yurtseverliktir/ Gezi gözü pekliktir/ Gezi gençliğimizdir/ Gezi 
birlikteliğimizdir/ Gezi omuzdaşlıktır/ Gezi aşktır/ Gezi bireyciliği 
aşmaktır/ Gezi ben değil biz olmamızdır/ Gezi öz saygımız, öz 
güvenimizdir/ Gezi özgürlük sevgimizdir/ Gezi tek değil çok olmaktır/ 
Gezi ışık hızıyla çoğalmaktır / [...] /Gezi sanatım bilimin üstünlüğüdür / 
[...] / Gezi şiirdir, resimdir, şarkıdır/ Gezi insan olma farkıdır/ Gezi ışıktır 
umudu aydınlatan/ Gezi bilinçtir karanlığı ışıtan64/ [...] (Behramoğlu Ne 
Çok 49-51) 
The poem goes one with similar and repetitive sentences. Here we have a very explicit 
end rhyme scheme with to distiches such as the ones done with suffixes -dur, -tir, -dir, 
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 Behramoğlu is referring to nationwide Gezi Park protests that were initiated to protect a local park against the 
AKP and then prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s persistent imposition to replace the park with an Islamic-Ottoman 
social complex. 
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 I prefer to keep the original verses in the language it was written to give readers a chance to get the rhythm and 
rhyme that are almost non-existent. 
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 “Gezi is our honor/ Gezi is our resistance to tyrant, and persecution/ Gezi is patriotism/ Gezi is to be brave/ Gezi is 
our youth/ Gezi is our togetherness/ Gezi is to share our shoulders/ Gezi is love / Gezi is to overcome individuality/ 
Gezi is to become us not me/ Gezi is our self-esteem and self-confidence/ Gezi is our love to freedom/ Gezi is to 
become many not one/ Gezi is to reproduce at speed of light/ [...] / Gezi is the superiority of art and science/ [...]/ 
Gezi is poem, painting and song/ Gezi is the privilege of being human/ Gezi is the light enlightening hope/ Gezi is 
the consciousness illuminating the dark/ [...]” My translation. 
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but there is no overall meter and almost no harmony both between distiches and among 
the individual sentences. The lines “Gezi ben değil biz olmamızdır/ Gezi öz saygımız, 
öz güvenimizdir”, for instance, do not even have assonance or alliteration to create an 
illusion of poetry within them. The whole poem relies on the repetitions created by 
“Gezi is [...]” but such a poetry, with no philosophy, original imagery and language 
cannot be considered as fine poetry just because it has got repetitions and end rhyme. 
What is so original in the sentence that reads “Gezi is love”. Is it introducing us a new 
image? Has it found a new way of expressing Gezi in its relationship to love? It is as if 
we are reading a parody poem that might be recreating banal love poems of the popular 
culture to expose their shallowness in expression. However, there is no parody in 
Behramoğlu’s poem. The problem here is that it probably is not trying to be poetic, after 
all.  Just as it happens in Baykam’s artistry, Behramoğlu seems to have been lost in his 
endeavor to pass his political remarks. His intention seems to be repeating the word 
“Gezi” to make it echo in his readers’ minds. It is as if we were again watching a 
political rally, and the only concern of the politician’s was to win an “election of 
discourses”  against AKP, by repeating the word “Gezi”, a word towards which AKP 
obviously feels antipathy -if not completely loathes it. I believe the metaphor of election 
works better if we notice the effort to reach out as many people as possible thanks to 
commonplace and sentimental sayings that people would remember from Gezi protests 
such as “Gezi is our honor” and that people would not have difficulty in reading and 
empathising with, like “Gezi is love.”. That is to say, Behramoğlu is trying to gather as 
many people as possible to his  rally with his unoriginal and extremely reachable and 
explicit language with as little poetry as possible. Let us have a look at another poem 
from the same book, Ne Çok Hain, to see if we can find recurring problems in 
Behramoğlu’s poetry. This one is called Adale  Y r y şç lerine, dedicated to marchers 
of the “Justice March”, an event prepared by CHP.  It reads, “Dağ başını duman almış/ 
İşı mı z çok, vaktı mı z dar/  Vatan ağır yaralanmış/ Yürüyelı m arkadaşlar.65” (Behramoğlu 
Ne Çok 85). Once again, Behramoğlu is reminding us popular lines from a poem, a 
march often known as  ençlik Marşı (March of  he You h) with which Turkish society 
is very familiar. Once again, we do not encounter an original language in this poem. 
What we have is lines echoing verses from a popular and often political march. Once 
again, poetry is not the main priority which is the political and the popular echo the 
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 Please note that in the book, all letters are written in capital letters.  
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verses create. In both of these poems, language and poetry in general is not a authentic 
language but is seeking for its readers who are familiar with these popular 
verses/statements. This kind of poetry has been criticized, and rightfully so, many poets 
including Cemal Süreya, who is among the most renowned poets of Turkish literature. 
In his book Folklor  iire D şman, Cemal Süreya argues against a poetic language that 
utilizes folkloric thus popular elements and sayings
66
. I agree with Süreya in the sense 
that utilizing such elements would hinder original language and poetry, putting us in a 
spiral of unauthentic language thus poetry and images, which he calls a “barren path” 
(Süreya 23). 
Having seen the poetry that Behramoğlu has created recently, we can have a look at the 
underlying reasons behind it. After spending a lot of time with the certain style and 
language Kemalists use,  and the kind of psychology they are often in, I can confidently 
say that again, the feeling of paranoia against the resurgence of political Islam has a role 
in the shape the poetry of Behramoglu have taken. In these and the majority of the 
poems in the book Ne Çok Hain, we can notice a number of paranoid or paranoia-
inducing elements and related language together with other symptomatic and defensive 
elements of paranoia in politics. In the first poem we analyzed, the second line openly 
gives away its paranoid way of thinking and style. “Gezi is our resistance to tyrant, and 
persecution.”. At this point, I see it necessary to remind the very close relationship of 
the idea of persecution and being persecuted with the paranoid psyche/hatred, as Freud 
made it clear with his formulation. After the projection of I hate him is complete, the 
mechanism “He hates me (persecutes me), which will justify me in hating him.” (Freud 
Complete 63) takes place, creating the idea of persecution in paranoid thinking. 
Similarly, one can claim that Ataol is, like other Kemalists we have analyzed, is 
projecting his own hatred onto the other and thinks that the other persecutes him. This 
formulation makes more sense if we start to read the whole poem as a defense 
mechanism to this hatred/paranoid thinking. Clearly, Ataol attaches a lot of importance 
to Gezi in his poem and says at one point that “Gezi ışıktır umudu aydınlatan/ Gezi 
bilinçtir karanlığı ışıtan”. The interpretation can be made twofold here. At the first 
level, Ataol seems to see Gezi as a “hope” against “darkness”, which is another 
paranoid element Kemalists see in Islamists- and for the sake of inserting and repeating 
the name of this hope against the “darkness” and “persecution”, he takes the aesthetics 
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 Süreya, Cemal. Folklor Şiire Düşman. İstanbul: Can Yayınları. 1992. Print. p 23. 
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for granted. The only aim of his is to put Gezi, which seems to ease his hatred/paranoid 
psyche as he sees it as a kind of “hope”, at the center of his poem, again at the expense 
of his poetry. This seems to be his method of dealing with the hatred/ paranoid thinking, 
induced by Islamic/Islamist elements. Of course, another point that is important is the 
Kemalist echoes the poem makes and leveling Gezi and Kemalist ideology/language. 
When Ataol tells that “Gezi is the light that enlightens the hope.”, which evokes the 
Enlightenment, in which the intellectual roots of Kemalism are found, or when he uses 
words that are often favored by Kemalist dictionary such as “the superiority of science 
and art”, or  “patriotism”, we come to perceive that it is Kemalism that Behramoğlu is 
relying on his hatred to ease off, as other Kemalists have done. It is not necessary to talk 
about the paradoxical nature of such a way of thinking again, as we have already 
established that paranoid thinking is mostly initiated by the Kemalist ideology and style 
itself.  
A similar approach of Behramoğlu where he serves Kemalist language for the sake of 
easing off his hatred and paranoid thinking at the expense of aesthetics can be seen in 
the other poem we quoted above, where paranoid elements are contrasted with Kemalist 
style/ideology. Even though it is a quadrant, we can realize similar elements 
counterbalanced with similar mechanisms. The lines that have the same end rhyme in 
Turkish “The smoke has taken over the top of the mountain” and “the 
homeland/motherland has been wounded heavily” are the lines that let us know about 
the paranoid psyche Behramoğlu in, once again. We have a dark image “the smoke” 
and the image of motherland/homeland that has been hurt -by the other, again in these 
lines. Of course, these paranoid elements, the projected feelings are counterbalanced 
with the shouting capitalized letters of the poem, which is an indication of the anxiety 
he is feeling. However, more importantly, the march that is often associated with the 
foundation of the republic and Kemalism has had to echo, making it complete with the 
reference made to CHP’s march, a Kemalist endeavor. What is lost, in this game of 
paranoia, hatred, anxiety and envy, is the poetry and the aesthetics that are left behind 
the ideology that needs to be put forward. One can claim that the poetry of Behramoğlu 
has always been “mediocre” and the reason for this mediocrity may not be the 
consequence of the paranoid style he has adopted recently. However, someone who 
checks some of Behramoğlu’s earlier poems especially his pre-1990s ones would easily 
notice that his poems do not have stereotypical Kemalist propositions against political 
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Islam and the elements from that particular paranoid style even on similar topics like 
the homeland/country being upset and in predicament. A few lines from a poem written 
in 1980 would suffice in showing us the difference in content and style between 
imaginative calm sadness Behramoğlu was depicting and the paranoid and anxious ones 
that have been analyzed above.  “Türkiye, üzgün yurdum, güzel yurdum/ Dağ rüzgârı, 
portakal balı/ Alçakgönüllü, hünerli, sevdalı./ Türkiye, üzgün yurdum, güzel yurdum/ 
Yazgısı kara yazılmış gelin/ Kurumuş sütü memelerinin.67” (Behramoğlu 
Yaşadıklarımdan 80). A similar Oedipal approach that Kemalists have always had 
exists here as well, but does not even the use of punctuation, imagery that it is evoking 
and the existence concern for rhyme and rhythm show us how much the poetry of 
Behramoğlu has transformed into one that is at the same level of political manifestos 
and works of popular culture and how much the resurgence of political Islam has 
affected his style? 
If we go through the book of Behramoğlu’s with a fine-tooth comb, we can also see the 
instances where the fear of insects and the dark/melancholic atmosphere in the poems 
are observed once more and these words uttered are understood to be again against 
political Islam. In one of his poems, Behramoğlu writes “when the light of the truth 
blinds their eyes/ just like creatures that feed in the dark/ even though they try to run 
away flopping/they will perish in the light of the mind” (Behramoğlu 24). Once again 
we face statements uttered by a Kemalist in which s/he parallels “the other” to insects or 
creatures
68
. Let us not state the obvious here again. The insect imagery and paranoia are 
related and often referenced in Kemalist texts. What is more subtle is to explain how 
one can understand that Behramoğlu is referring to political Islam with his words. This 
is where the light-darkness dichotomy enters the scene. Of course what is helping us 
here to make such a deduction is not only the fact that Behramoğlu and other Kemalists 
made the parallelism between darkness and political Islam before. It is actually the 
subtle reference Kemalism is often making. That is the Enlightenment principles of 
spending too much on reason and leaving no space on metaphysics in thinking, which 
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 “Turkey, my sad and beautiful land/ the mountain wind, the orange honey/ modest, talented and in love/ Turkey, 
my sad and beautiful land/ the bride of a dark fate/ milk dried up in your breast.” My translation. Please note that this 
part of the poem originally has -a-b-b/-a-c-c rhyme scheme which lacks in my translation. 
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 It is important to remember that “creature” was a word Mustafa Kemal used frequently -for Vahdettin in 
particular. 
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Kemalism relies on, as we claimed above. So the specific choice of words related to 
darkness is particular to political Islam, which of course has metaphysical elements due 
to its base in religion. In that sense, we can understand that whenever darkness is 
mentioned in a Kemalist text, we may understand that it refers to -political- Islam
69
. The 
same logic applies when the imagery of darkness is adopted as a characteristic of 
paranoia in those texts. We can even go further and claim that the dark imagery has 
been referred this much in Kemalist paranoid style because of Enlightenment lexicon. 
Would it be too much to put forward that Enlightenment, with its rigid framework of 
ideas might have contributed to the forming of paranoid psyche/style in societies and 
politics in general -and the one Kemalists possess in particular- since it was 
Enlightenment that went against religious foundations in general in the first place? 
In short, let us note at the end that even though one might not see the direct relationship 
with the insect fear/analogy and darkness, we have seen above that the image of insect 
can also be found in the paranoid cases and darkness is a common image used in both 
claustrophobia and paranoia in the shape of shades, shadows and so on. 
To sum up, in the light of what have been discussed, we see that paranoia and paranoia 
inducing and counter mechanisms lead the Kemalist artists/writers in question to fall to 
the level of popular culture in terms of aesthetics, with the same mechanisms they 
adopt, the similar language and style they use and the feeling they suffer and deepen at 
the same time, against a group of people and the ideology they conflict with. 
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 After all, such an imagery would not be the one Kemalists would adopt against an “other” who in the eyes of 
Kemalists are considered as already developed and enlightened -say- the West.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
  
Paranoid style in politics might be an “international phenomenon” as Hofstadter 
claimed years ago. However, its density and frequency of adoption by the political 
agents probably differ due to many reasons such as political traditions, culture, 
geopolitics, inner conflicts within the countries. Of course, to claim such density differs 
requires another lengthy and comparative study, which I did not attempt to do in this 
one.  Still, I feel that the Turkish political context might have one of the most intense 
paranoid styles of all the rhetorics adopted in the international arena. As one can 
understand, I have not been interested in the fact that if Kemalists might have realistic 
grounds for adopting such a paranoid style against political Islam. What I have been 
trying to unearth and point to has been the certain type of style that has been adopted for 
years and its possible effects on the society, culture and politics. Clearly, the Kemalist 
discourse has manifested many symptoms of paranoia such as narcissism, splitting, 
envy together with non-overcome Oedipus conflicts indirectly most of the time, if not 
directly a paranoid one. Even though the frequency and the shape of this paranoid style 
have shown a little difference due to fact that Kemalist ideology has lost its powerful 
position and eventually political power together with bureaucracy, the characteristics, 
the way Kemalists manifested the existing paranoia has remained pretty much the same 
since the infancy of the ideology with much owing to the texts Mustafa Kemal has 
produced.  
But what do all these suggest for the ideology, the agents and the society in general? 
The first outcome I relate to the paranoid style in politics and culture is about the issues 
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with democracy. If we agree that an ideology that has not reformed itself, that has been 
fixed in early stages of its developments cannot keep up with the necessary changes of 
the day and would have serious problems in being democratic. If we continue our 
metaphor of child-ideology/ and/or human psyche-political psyche, the amount of 
hatred and envy cannot allow Kemalists to think outside that psychological state and 
treat Islamists equally right not only as citizens but also on the intellectual level. That is 
to say, too much hatred towards a group like Islamists somehow ban them from even 
discussing political concepts, like laicite democratically. We cannot even assume that a 
Kemalist would discuss the nature and future of laicite if the proposition of discussion 
came from an Islamist
70
. Bülent Somay, who has already contributed a lot to this study, 
elegantly put the outcome of oedipal conflicts in a society saying that “Oedipal children 
can be anything but independent” (Somay Çokbilmiş 112). They are, as Hofstadter 
would call “double sufferers of history”, who are “afflicted not only by the real world, 
with the rest of us, by his fantasies as well.” (Hofstadter, 86). Fantasies that were 
created and rooted mostly by the father of this society, it seems. “Sufferer”, I believe, is 
an apt word for those who really are torn between their real desires and their create 
desires as no other word would describe, for instance, the psyche of Nurullah Ataç
71
 
who has always been torn between his love for Ottoman “Divan” poetry and his 
assurance to leave it completely behind. He often disclosed his conflict, his suffering 
with sentences like “[y]ou know that I love our old poetry, the Ottoman poetry a lot. 
Also, I am angry at it and at myself for loving it. We must shut off that poetry, leave it 
completely, forget and not teach it to our children” (Ataç, 97). Why does Ataç feel 
almost guilty and gets mad at himself for loving the old poetry and “suffers”? Since he 
feels, he is doing something that has been marked as out-of-question by the Kemalist 
“revolution” to which he was always dedicated. Somay rightfully explained such 
phenomena by putting forward that in Turkish society “psychotic segmentations” and 
“neurotic ambivalent manners” occur when “individuals come up against the state” 
(Somay Çokbilmiş 104). 
                                               
70
 Admittedly, such a discussion would sound almost impossible even though it came from another group other than 
Islamists, as well. Still, such a proposition would stir the already stirred paranoid feelings of Kemalists.  
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Ataç has been considered as one of the literary critics and essayists in Turkish literature by many. He has also been 
among the most fervent Kemalist supporters as one can easily understand from his writings. 
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It is not only being fixed at an early stage that prevents Kemalism being a democratic 
ideology. The splitting actually serves a similar end, as well since a splitting in the 
psyche and in languages does nothing but polarizes the political and cultural domain, 
thus, the society and the country. A dialogue may not be realized in a scenario where 
one group calls the other one “insect”, for instance, as Genç would call.  
Besides all these implications in politics, the analyses of the cultural works included in 
this study also close the discussion of the long-lasting endeavors of re-naming or even 
redefining Kemalism. The concept of neo-Kemalism has been among the ones that have 
been recirculated the most. The term neo-Kemalism has been referred to the “civil” side 
of the ideology that included “NGOs, a series of Kemalist magazines and opinion leader 
within media” that “appeared as a separate power besides political parties and the state” 
(Erdoğan 585). For Necmi Erdoğan’s observations and analyses, “neo-Kemalist 
discourse splits the political domain to two antagonistic parties as secular/non-secular, 
republican/ anti-republican, modern/ reactionary, Kemalist/ Second Republican, 
nationalitarian/ separatist” (Erdoğan 586). He continues and claims that “[o]ne of the 
obvious themes of neo-Kemalist discourse is the feeling of victimization that feeds on 
paranoid mindset.” (Erdoğan 587). What is apparent in Erdoğan’s words is the 
following: what he refers to neo-Kemalism is not actually anything new if we follow 
the scheme and analyses I have offered in this study. For me, the “civil” side of 
Kemalism has always manifested itself in the works of culture as a way of propaganda 
and as a result of paranoid thinking. I contend that re-naming Kemalism would not 
serve the purpose of showing the ideology as a progressive one. I once again claim that 
Kemalism has not changed but fixated at the early stages of its developments. It has 
weighed more one “nationalism” and “secularism” side of Kemalism instead of 
“referomism” tenet of the ideology. And paranoid style, I put forward, might have 
played a big role in not being able to mature and be more democratic as an ideology.  
I believe that such psychosocial, psychopolitical and psychocultural studies as this one 
and Somay’s The Psychopolitics of the Oriental Father Between Omnipotence and 
Emasculation can enrich the contention of academics, politicians or anyone interested 
in such disciplines alike in the sense that even if they might think that such studies are 
not “scientific”, they can show the similarities between two unthinkable domains and 
open up new spaces of thinking and even spaces of action if one can draw reasonable 
conclusions from the studies. In this respect, I have come to think a lot of questions that 
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could not be answered or pursued in this study for practical reasons, which could again 
open up new opportunities for further studies that could bear important analyses for 
numerous domains. Some of these questions are as follows and are asked only for 
thought provocation. Can we think of  and establish a correlation or relationship 
between nationalism/racism and paranoid rhetoric? To ask it another way, do nationalist 
or racist ideologies heighten the feeling of paranoia within the political, societal and 
individual psyche? Can there be a relationship between the name of the ideologies that 
are named after their founder/ideologues/ founding fathers and the feeling of bonding 
with it in terms of the society and individuals? What would Lacan’s “name of the 
father” theory add to and imply for such an idea? Besides such grand theoretical 
questions, ff we think about Turkey more specifically, and Kemalism in particular, we 
can come up with more concrete questions as well? For instance, why have Kemalist 
writers have started to produce more works pertaining to  juvenile literature than 
before? Does such inclination have anything to do with the way Kemalism has 
developed or not developed itself since its foundation? Can this leaning be linked with 
child psychology in any way? These and many more questions like these can be 
formulated and their possible answers can avail many disciplines for further thinking 
and study. 
Before ending thesis, I would like to address to some of the criticisms this study might 
receive upon its publishing. The first of these might be about the way I singled out 
Mustafa Kemal and his language and did not refer to paranoia and paranoid style that 
was existent before him, which of course affected him and his rhetoric one way or 
another. For instance, we know that one of Mustafa Kemal’s favorite poets, Namık 
Kemal, utilized a language which was classified as paranoid, as Somay would report 
(Somay Psychopolitics 100). Even though this was the case, the inclusion of earlier eras 
and their rhetoric would make this thesis a much lengthier than it is now and at the end 
would be too difficult to follow. Like the answers of the questions I have asked above, 
this can be done in a different study as well. For now, this study has happened to be 
only interested in the agent(s) that shaped the Kemalist side of the paranoid style in the 
Turkish context.   
Another criticism would be about the positionality of this thesis in the political 
spectrum. I understand that the study can be exploited by Islamists and other anti-
Kemalist agents in Turkey, making Kemalism the scapegoat for many recent political 
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failures, which may or may not be the case, or using the statements of this thesis as a 
way of attacking the Kemalist ideology. However, one should be made clear that this 
thesis is purely academic and has had no intention of attacking any of the ideological 
figures of Turkish politics as I was not interested in analyzing particular individuals but 
the Kemalist language in general
72
. After all, I repeat that I have not been interested in 
showing if the Kemalist claims for reactionism have realistic grounds or not. I have just 
focused on the rhetoric produced around the concept and its possible implications for 
individuals, society, politics and so on. Also, claiming that Kemalism is suffering from 
a paranoid style does not mean that other parties against it are not. I once again state 
that starting with Islamism, many parties against Kemalism seem to suffer from a 
similar if not more intensified paranoid psyche even though they proudly position 
themselves somewhere opposite Kemalism. Instead of nitpicking statements to use 
against the political rivals, agents may as well try to benefit from the implications the 
study and such studies offer and look for ways to mature. Years ago, Murat Belge 
published an article in which he questioned why a certain poster had been continuously 
becoming popular in which a child with a teardrop is depicted. He concludes that “[o]ur 
society is, generally, is a society that is guilty
73
 against its children. [...] [t]his child can 
evoke the feelings that have been dozing off in the deepest dungeons of our 
consciousness.” (Belge 183-184). I claim that most of us are still those children and we 
are equally guilty against ourselves as well as our children. The time for the of us to 
leave behind the early stages of development, to mature and to shatter the “imprisoned 
state
74” that narcissism -thus paranoia- brings into existence may have been long 
overdue. Still, the following saying provides the best advice: “Better late than never”.   
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 Of course, I must admit the fact that I have not gone through the whole Kemalist canon and that there may be 
occasional exceptions which/who do not belong to the generality I have described in the thesis in terms of paranoid 
style.  
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 Nurdan Gürbilek also makes a reference to the same poster by claiming that “people put themselves in the child’s 
shoes rather than against it as a [...] guilty adult.” (Gürbilek 39). If that were the case, the society/child analogy 
would still be reasonable. 
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